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CAUSE AND CONVICTION:
The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims
Teressa E. Ravenell
On December 15, 1984 William O’Dell Harris, a talented athlete
in Rand, West Virginia, had the same concerns as most teenagers.
Harris had been offered several college scholarships and was
deciding where to attend college.1 Six months later, after being
falsely accused of sexually assaulting a young woman, Harris was
dealing with issues that would confound most adults.2
On December 16, 1984, a young woman who lived near Harris
was sexually assaulted outside of her home.3 Harris was arrested
and charged with first-degree sexual assault approximately seven
months later.4 Although Harris was a juvenile at the time of the
assault prosecutors opted to try him as an adult.5 At trial, the
victim identified Harris as her attacker,6 the deputy sheriff
“emphatically supported her testimony” 7 and Fred Zain, a police
serologist, “testified that the genetic markers in the semen left by
the assailant matched those of Harris and only 5.9 percent of the
population.”8 Despite Harris’s alibi9 and repeated proclamations
of his innocence, a jury returned with a guilty verdict. The jury
convicted Harris of second-degree sexual assault after less than
 Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., 1998,
University of Virginia; J.D., 2002, Columbia University School of Law.
1
See GEORGE CASTELLE AND ELIZABETH F. LOFUS, MISINFORMATION AND
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES OF FAILED
JUSTICE 20 (Saundra D. Westervelt and John A. Humphrey eds. 2005)
(describing defendant in State of West Virginia v. William O’Dell Harris, Jr.,
No. 86-F-442 (Circuit Court, Kanawha County, W. Va. 1987)).
2
See id. (noting imminent collapse of Harris’s promising future as false
accusations of rape would soon lead to his wrongful conviction).
3
See Edward Connors et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Convicted By Juries,
Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish
Innocence
After
Trial
55-56
(1996),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf
(describing undisputed facts of
assault and rape).
4
See id. at 55 (reporting that attack occurred on December 16, 1984 and
Harris’s arrest on July, 25 1985).
5
See id. at 56 (describing facts of case). The government moved to have the case
transferred from juvinile to adult status. See id. The court granted the motion on
May 16, 1986. See id
6
See id. (identifying Harris both in police lineup and at trial).
7
CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1, at 20.
8
CONNORS ET AL., supra note 3, at 56.
9
See id. (noting alibi defense). Harris’s girlfriend at the time of the crime
testified that he was with her when the assault occurred. See id. Unfortunately,
Harris’s girlfriend was the only one who could corroborate the alibi. See id.
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four hours of deliberation.10 On October 18, 1987, Harris was
sentenced to 10 to 20 years in prison.11
Six years after his conviction, in November of 1993, Harris filed a
Petition for Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus wherein he consented
to DNA testing of any remaining evidence.12 After failing to
comply with three court orders to release the trial evidence for
DNA analysis, the sheriff’s department finally claimed that all the
evidence from Harris’s trial had been lost. 13 An investigator for
the defense later found semen evidence taken from the victim
during her medical examination after the 1985 attack. 14 After two
tests both of which showed that Harris “was not the donor of the
semen on the evidence slide, the district attorney held a press
conference on August 1, 1995, to state that Harris was
innocent.”15 “On October 10, 1995, Harris's conviction was
vacated. One month later, the court also dismissed the underlying
indictment. Harris had served 7 years of his sentence and an
additional year of home confinement.”16
The detective who testified in Harris’s trial was later convicted of
perjury.17 Additionally, a report by The American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors concluded that Fred Zain, the Police
serologist who testified at Harris’s trial, had engaged in numerous
10

See id. (describing quick jury verdict).
See id. (reporting sentence). Harris was credited 75 days for time already
served. See id.
12
See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 3, at 56. (describing Harris’s post-conviction
challenges). On November 10, 1993 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals allowed special habeas corpus proceedings for any case in which the
testimony of Fred Zain, the police serologist who testified at Harris’s trial. See
id. Harris therefore filed a writ of habeas corpus and consented to DNA testing
as a condition of relief. See id.
13
See id. (tracing police response to court orders). On December , 29 1993 a
circuit court judge ordered the prosecutors to release the evidence from Harris’s
trial. See id. This order was repeated a month later after the prosecutors failed to
comply. See id. At a hearing where Harris was moved to home confinement, the
order was repeated yet again. See id. The sheriff’s department then told the court
that the trial evidence had been lost. See id.
14
See id. (discussing discovery of preserved semen sample). After finding the
sample Harris’s attorney sought the release of the sample to undergo DNA
testing. See id. The judge issued a fourth order to release the evidence and the
police finally complied. See id. Harris’s attorney also filed a contempt of court
motion against the prosecutors for not turning over the samples as previously
ordered by the court. See id. The district attorney argued that the victim had
been uncooperative and that the sample had since been submitted for DNA
testing. See id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 3, at 56. (noting subsequent perjury
conviction).
11
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acts of misconduct and that this misconduct was “the result of
systematic practice rather than an occasional inadvertent error.” 19
There is also evidence to suggest that the victim was repeatedly
exposed to suggestive interviewing techniques20 and that the
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As William Harris’s case demonstrates, the United States criminal
justices system can erroneously convict persons of crimes. Recent
statistics on wrongful convictions confirm that the United States
criminal justice system convicts, incarcerates, and, in some
instances, executes people for crimes of which they are innocent.21
18

See Matter of Investigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory,
Serology Division, 438 S.E.2d 501, 516 (W.Va., 1993) (summarizing report by
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors). The court summarized
Zain’s acts of misconduct as follows:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1)
overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the
frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of
evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches
on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple
items had been tested, when only a single item had been
tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6)
repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to
create the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been
obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results;
(10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported
only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically
impossible or improbable results.
Id. Despite the numerous allegations of wrongdoings, Zain died of
colon cancer before he could be convicted of perjury. See W. JERRY
CHISUM & BRENT E. TURVEY, CRIME RECONSTRUCTION ## (2006).
19
Id.
20
See CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1, at 22-23. (tracing repeated police
interviews after vicitim asserted Harris was not the attacker). According to
George Castelle, the attorney who represented Harris in his post-conviction
appeals, a police report, “which Castelle said had been concealed for over a
decade, indicated the victim initially said she knew Harris and he wasn't the man
who attacked her. He said it's possible the victim was told of Zain's evidence,
and based on that, she may have believed she was mistaken when she initially
said he wasn't the rapist.” Author, Title, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 18, 1998,
at page.
21
See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED: TOO MANY
WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED
43,
n.
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/ip_200.pdf. (citing calculations of various
wrongful conviction experts). The Innocence Project report cites recent work by
Professor Samuel Gross, that calculated 2.3% of prisoners sentenced to death
between 1973 and 1989 were exonerated and freed. See id. Professor Michael
Risinger estimated that between 3.3% and 5% of defendants were wrongly
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Although wrongful convictions may be an inevitable consequence
of our criminal justice system, it would seem that a person wrongly
deprived of his liberty is entitled a civil remedy to compensate for
the mistakes of the criminal system.22 Yet, persons wrongly
convicted of a crime who bring § 1983 actions for an erroneous
arrest, detention, or conviction are often denied monetary
compensation.23
There are a number of bases for courts to deny exonerees a § 1983
monetary remedy for their erroneous conviction. First, although
such convictions may be factually wrong, they may not be legally
wrong. To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant caused him to be deprived of a constitutional
right. Furthermore, even in cases where the plaintiff is able to
prove a constitutional violation the persons responsible for the
deprivation are often immune from suit.24
Legal scholarship discussing § 1983 actions for wrongful
convictions typically focus on the following: (1) whether wrongful
convictions and/or prosecution violates the Constitution and (2) the
role of absolute and qualified immunity in these cases.25
convicted and sentenced to death for murders involving rape between 1982 and
1989. See id. The report contends that if there some two million inmates and as
few as 1% (a conservative estimate) are innocent, then there are more than
20,000 people in jail who were wrongly convicted. See id.
22
See Carey v. Phipus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) ("The cardinal principle of
damages in Anglo American law is that of compensation for the injury caused to
plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty." (quoting 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law
of Torts § 25.1, p. 1299 (1956))).
23
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 34-35 (finding less than half of
exonerees were able to recover compensation). Only 45% of the 200 exonerees
who had been cleared through the use of DNA evidence were able to collect
either through state compensation statutes or civil lawsuits. See id. at 34.
24
See O’Neal v. Mississippi Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 63, 65 (Miss. 1997)
(citing Supreme Court’s narrow understanding of absolute immunity). Judges,
performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction and prosecutors performing
their duties are granted absolute immunity from monetary damages. See id.
Witnesses are similarly grated absolute immunity. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460
U.S. 325, 325 (1983) (“No evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the
traditional common witness immunity in § 1983 actions.”). Other state actors,
such as the police officers who investigated and arrested the plaintiff and
forensic who may have analyzed evidence in the case are often shielded by
qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818) (“government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”).
25
See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983
Litigation, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1982) (opining mental requirements similar to
Fourteenth Amendment are necessary for liability to attach under § 1983);
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Furthermore legal scholars who do discuss civil remedies for
wrongful convictions only focus one or two actors in the criminal
justice process who might be civilly liable. 26 Yet, as Harris’s case
suggests, “wrongful convictions do not result from a single flaw or
mistake; many factors can be at the root of a wrongful
conviction.”27 Such factors may include biased police lineups,
mistaken eyewitness identification, faulty forensic science, coerced
false confessions, and unreliable informants.28 Accordingly, one
person is seldom the “cause” of a wrongful conviction. This
severely complicates questions of causation in § 1983 litigation,
which requires a plaintiff to prove that each individual defendant
deprived him of a specific constitutional right and the deprivation
of this constitutional right, in turn, caused his injuries.
This Article discusses the availability of a § 1983 civil remedy for
persons wrongly convicted. Nevertheless, this Article approaches
the issue from a very different angle. The primary focus of this
Article is not whether wrongful convictions violate the
Constitution nor is it whether certain immunities shield
government officials from monetary liability. Instead, I consider
the role of causation in these§ 1983 cases.
Although, causation is seldom mentioned as an element of a §
1983 claim, causation plays two roles in § 1983 litigation. First,
causation is an inherent part of the deprivation element of a § 1983

Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 Geo. L.J.
1441(1989) (noting confusion § 1983 litigation has brought to constitutional law
debates); see also, e.g., Barbra Rook Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A
Unified Approach To Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L.
Rev. 633 (1986) (discussing trends in absolute and qualified immunity
defenses); Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official
Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 625 (1989) (finding
immunities may offer municipalities too much protection from liability).
26
See CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1, at 18 (“When an innocent person is
convicted, that conviction is often attributed to a single mistake. . . . Indeed,
much of the current research into wrongful conviction cases focuses on one
mistake or one part of the criminal justice process in which a mistake
occurred.”). See, e.g., Michael Avery, Paying For Silence: The Liability of
Police Officers Under Section 1983 For Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13
Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (discussing difficulties in
demonstrating police officer liability under § 1983); John Williams, False
Arrest, Malicious Prosecution, and Abuse of Process in § 1983 Litigation, 20
Touro L. Rev. 705 (2004) (exploring possible liability for prosecutors under §
1983).
27
CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1, at 9-10.
28
See id. at 9 (describing various factors that may bring about wrongful
convictions).
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claim.
Additionally, causation serves as a link between the
defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s damages, which I refer to as
“damages causation.” Courts have used this second form of
causation to limit liability in § 1983 wrongful conviction claims. I
argue that courts’ approaches to damages causation in § 1983
claims unnecessarily and improperly limits defendants’ liability in
these cases.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins with a brief
overview of the most common reasons persons are convicted of
crimes of which they are innocent. These reasons include
eyewitness misidentification, police and prosecutorial misconduct,
and ineffective defense counsel. Part B of this section explains
that while the number of persons exonerated from their convictions
has increased in recent years, there has not been a corresponding
rise in the availability of civil remedies to persons wrongly
convicted of a crime. This section concludes that the absence of
alternative civil remedies has led to a surge in the number of §
1983 wrongful conviction cases.
Part III considers how plaintiffs and courts have attempted to fit
wrongful conviction claims into the § 1983 rubric. To do so, an
exonoree must prove that the alleged conduct deprived him of a
federally protected right. In other words, he must translate the
basic facts leading to his conviction into the language of a federal
statutory violation. I suggest that most § 1983 wrongful conviction
claims are cast as a Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim. This portion of the Article
concludes that the Court’s method of distinguishing Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process rights often
makes it difficult to categorize the acts that lead to wrongful
convictions as a deprivation of a federal right, as required for a
viable § 1983 claim.
Part IV expands upon Part III’s discussion of § 1983 jurisprudence.
This section, however, examines the role of causation in wrongful
conviction cases for monetary damages. I argue that causation
plays two roles in § 1983 litigation for compensatory damages.
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant causes him to be
deprived of a constitutional right. Furthermore, there must be a
causal link between this constitutional breach and the plaintiff’s
29

See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF § 1983 § 3:108 (4th ed. 2005) (“As emphasized in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, the very language
of § 1983 requires causal relation between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s
constitutional deprivation.”).
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actual injury. This section goes onto describe how courts have
approached these questions in § 1983 litigation and considers the
policy arguments courts have advanced to support their varying
approaches to causation in § 1983 wrongful conviction cases.
Part V goes onto argue that § 1983 jurisprudence has developed in
such a way that the role of proximate cause in negligence actions –
to limit liability to those situations where it justifiable – has
already been satisfied by other elements, rendering the role of
proximate cause in § 1983 redundant and largely unnecessary.
Part A provides a brief overview of the history of legal causation in
the common law of torts, focusing primarily on the policy reasons
for limiting liability in tort negligence actions. Part B then
discusses the role of qualified immunity in § 1983 litigation and
compares the policy concerns underlying the availability of
qualified immunity and those legal theorists and courts use to
rationalize proximate cause in negligence cases. This section
concludes proximate cause is not only an unnecessary limit on
liability § 1983 cases, but it is actually unjustified in those cases
where the defendant has been denied a qualified immunity defense.
II.

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

With a few exceptions, scholars have only recently begun tracking
the number of persons who have been exonerated of crimes they
did not commit. 30 In 1998, the National Institute of Justice issued
a report profiling 26 cases in which DNA evidence proved that
convicted person had not actually committed the crime.31 Even
more recently, Samuel L. Gross studied the cases of 340 persons
30

See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust
Conviction, 6 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 73, 75-80 (1999). In 1932, Edwin M.
Borchard published, Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice, the
first modern case study of the wrongfully convicted. See id. Borchard followed
the cases of sixty-five of individuals in the United States and England the author
believe to be “completely innocent” of the crimes for which they were
convicted. See id. Based upon his research, Borchard concluded that all criminal
justice systems should enact legislation to indemnify the wrongly convicted.
See id.; see also, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages
of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 23-24, 31-36 (1987)
(compiling case studies of 350 wrongful convictions). The authors compiled
350 cases of wrongful convictions for capital or potentially capital crimes
handed down between 1900 and 1985. See id. Of these crimes, 200 were firstdegree murder convictions, 73 second-degree murder, 14 other homicide, 39
unspecified and 24 rape convictions. See id. In 350 case studies, forty percent of
the criminal defendants were sentenced to death and twenty-three criminal
defendants were executed for crimes they did not commit. See id.
31
See generally CONNORS ET AL., supra note 3, at 33-74 (listing facts and
procedural histories of each case).
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who had been exonerated of the crimes of which they were
convicted.32
These case studies prove that wrongful convictions do occur. It is
difficult, however, to determine exactly how many people have
been convicted of crimes that they did not commit because neither
the federal government nor individual state governments track
these numbers.33 In the absence of more reliable data, many
scholars attempt to estimate the number of persons convicted of
crimes that they did not commit by focusing on the common
causes of wrongful convictions, the frequency that these errors
occur, and then extrapolating on the basis of this data.34
1. Causes of Wrongful Convictions
Wrongful convictions are usually a combination of many factors.
The most common of which are eyewitness misidentification,35
32

See Samuel R. Gross, et. al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 through
2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 528 (2005) (describing exoneration
trends). According to Gross, the number of exonerations grew from twelve per
year in 1989 to forty-two per year 2003. See id. at 527. Although DNA played a
role in most of the exonerations Gross studied, he noted a rise in the number of
exonerations that did not depend upon DNA evidence. See id. at 527.
33
See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 30, at 28 (“experience taught us that no
jurisdiction keeps a public list of its erroneous convictions, even in murder
cases. Moreover, most state officials are apparently not eager to assist
investigators in identifying such cases from whatever records they might have
available.”); see also Gross, et. al, supra note 32, at 525 (“There is no national
registry of exonerations, or any simple way to tell from official records which
dismissals, pardons, etc., are based on innocence.”). Nevertheless, some have
placed the number of wrongfully incarcerated citizens in the thousands, if not
tens of thousands. See id. at 551.
34
See generally Gross, supra note 32 (profiling 340 exonerations between 1989
and 2003); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 30 (comparing 350 cases of capital or
possibly capital offenses); CONNORS ET AL., supra note 3 (citing twenty-six
cases in support of government report).
35
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 18-19 (2007) (finding 77% of
wrongful convictions were result of eyewitness misidentification); see also
Gross, supra note 32, at 529-31 (discussing eyewitness misidentification in rape
and robbery cases); see also Bernhard, supra note 30, at 81-87 (presenting case
of People v. Marion Coakley). In this case a combination of genuine
misidentification by a traumatized victim and biased police investigation
techniques lead to a wrongful conviction. See id. Olga Delgado was raped by a
man she whose description’s most salient details were a dark complexion, an
“afro” haircut, and a Jamaican accent. See id. at 81-82. The police selected the
photo of Mr. Coakley and presented it in a photo array to Ms. Delgado and
another witness who both identified Mr. Coakley as the assailant. See id. at 81.
Coakley was arrested two days later and eventually convicted of rape. See id. at
81-82. After the trial several parts of the identification began to unravel. See id.
at 82. Ms. Delgado later admitted the only light in the room came from a
television screen, her face had been covered for much of the attack and that she
had been to scared to look at the victim directly when she had the opportunity.
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police and prosecutorial misconduct,36 flawed analysis of forensic
evidence,37 and ineffective defense counsel.38
Eyewitness misidentification represents the single most common
factor contributing to wrongful convictions in the United States.39
There are few things more compelling in a trial than a witness who
points out the accused to the jury as the perpetrator of the crime. 40
See id. at 82-83. It also came out that the police had pursued no other suspects
and failed to present contradictory evidence offered by another witness. See id.
at 83-84.
36
See Project Innocence, Understand the Causes: Government Misconduct,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last
visited Mar. 19, 2008) (offering statistics of government conduct). In the
Innocence Projects first 74 cases of exoneration it found that police misconduct
played a role in 37 of the cases, while prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in
33. See id.; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, And
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 35, 47 (2005) (citing
post-conviction admissions by witnesses that they had been coerced by police).
Garrett goes on to describe the police’s ability to mold a witnesses memory and
perception to make it fall in line with the case theory. See id. at 80-81; see also
Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation and the
Politics of Science, 4 Cardozo Pub. L., Pol’y & Ethics J. 271, 273 (2006)
(describing sometimes adversarial but often cooperative relationship between
police and prosecutors). Taslitz also suggests that measures taken to prevent
wrongful convictions must be aimed at both police and prosecutors. See id.
37
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 22-23 (finding 65% of wrongful
convictions were due at least in part to flawed forensic science).
38
Defense counsel must diligently examine and question eyewitness accounts
and the procurement of evidence to combat these causes of wrongful conviction.
Unfortunately, attorneys are often not up to the task, making ineffective defense
counsel another systemic cause of wrongful conviction. See, e.g., Mary Sue
Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National
Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2006) (discussing deficiencies in training,
supervision, evaluation and resources in state run defense organizations).
39
See Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php
(last visited Mar. 18, 2008) (stating eyewitness misidentification played a role in
75% of exonerations it followed). Eyewitnesses’ misidentifications play a role in
about half of the cases where a defendant is convicted of a murder that he did
not commit. See Gross, supra note 32, at 542. Witness misidentification is not
as prevalent in cases where the defendant is accused of murder as compared to
other criminal cases. Because of the nature of the crime, there is often only two
eyewitnesses to a murder, the victim and the perpetrator. Absent some hearsay
exception, the victim’s identification will not be introduced at trial.
Accordingly, there is not the same opportunity for misidentification in murder
cases as in other cases. In contrast, in a recent study, Samuel Gross found that
nearly 90% of sexual assault exonerations involved misidentification by at least
one witness. See id. at 529-30.
40
See Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute For
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 665, 675 (2002) (quoting
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979) “there is almost
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a
finger at the defendant, and says, ‘That’s the one!’”).
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Barry Sheck, founder of the Innocence Project at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University, documented at least
one case where five separate eyewitnesses misidentified the
defendant.41 In fact, the criminal cases most likely to result in
convictions are those cases where the prosecution is able to offer
eyewitness testimony, confessions, and/or forensic evidence.
Therefore, it should come as little surprise that it is these types of
evidence police and prosecutors wish to have when proceeding to
trial. Unfortunately, in many cases where witnesses have
misidentified suspects, the police and/or prosecution have
employed techniques that make it more likely that the witness will
identify a particular person.42 Similarly, evidence suggests that
police coerce confessions from at least some suspects. According
to one study, one quarter of all wrongful convictions can be
attributed to either a suspect false confession or an informant’s
false claim that the suspect confessed to him.43 The credibility
afforded forensic science also creates an incentive for police,
prosecutors, and lab technicians to present evidence procured
though questionable scientific practices.44 In the 200 cases of
wrongful imprisonment studied by the Innocence Project, 65%
were attributed, at least in part, to limited, unreliable or fraudulent
forensic science.45
41

See BARRY SHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 64 (2000) (charting
various causes of wrongful convictions uncovered by authors’ case studies). A
person’s recollection of total strangers, especially those of other races, is far
from perfect. These difficulties are often compounded by the emotional stress
of the crime. See Lopez, supra note 40, at 680 (noting numerous factors that
lead to genuine misidentification).
42
See SHECK, ET. AL., supra note 41, at 265 (finding that allegations of
suggestive identification procedures account for one-third of police misconduct
claims). One such suggestive technique involves weighting photo arrays. When
police have a suspect who they perceive to be the perpetrator they will
repeatedly include the suspect’s photograph in lineup arrays presented to
witnesses, this eventually makes the face of the suspect seem familiar to the
witness. Even if the witness has never physically encountered the suspect, the
sense of familiarity in a sea of unknown faces often leads to a false
identification.
43
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 26-27 (finding 25% of exonerees
were convicted, at least in part, by false confessions); see also id. at 32-33
(finding 15% of exonerees were convicted, at least in part, by testimony from
informants and snitches).
44
See Lopez, supra note 40, at 685 (discussing jurors’ perception of forensic
science as infallible); see also Garrett, supra note 36, at 95 (discussing
increasing trend of police officers falsely claiming physical evidence matches
samples taken from defendants).
45
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 22-23 (finding connection
between forensic flawed forensic science and wrongful convictions).
AND
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Clearly, not every wrongful conviction is the result of
manufactured or fabricated evidence. Nevertheless, even in those
cases where the police and prosecutors do not “doctor” the
evidence, it does not necessarily mean that the police and
prosecutors are without fault. Nearly one third of exoneration
cases involve suppression of exculpatory evidence by the police or
prosecution.46
Ideally, defense attorneys provide a check against police and
prosecution abuses. In reality, however, due to a number of
factors, state appointed attorneys may fail to provide their clients
with the most effective counsel possible. Bad lawyering is a
contributing factor in almost a quarter of wrongful convictions.47
And while egregious conduct by attorneys can form the basis for a
new trial,48 in most cases, the defense counsel’s conduct is not
sufficiently egregious to justify a new trial but is sufficiently poor
to cause an innocent person to be convicted. With poor Americans
constituting 80% of defendants, public defenders are
overworked.49 Chronic under funding leads to crushing workloads
and limited investigatory resources.50 Public defenders often have
little time and limited resources.51 Unfortunately, this means that
they are sometimes unable to devote the time necessary to
investigate the prosecution’s case and uncover evidence necessary
to challenge the state’s evidence, resulting in errors such as
incomplete cross-examination of witnesses and the failure to

46

See Garrett, supra note 36, at 70 (37% of case show suppression of evidence
by prosecutor, 34% show suppression of evidence by police).
47
See id. at 75 (commenting on inadequacy of counsel provided to indigent
defendants).
48
See Lopez, supra note 40, at 689 (citing cases where defense counsel was
personally under investigation and by their own admission too stressed to “think
straight”); see also Griffin v. Winans, 684 F.2d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 1982)
(affirming lower court ruling that trial attorney was intoxicated and therefore
ineffective).
49
See Backus & Marcus, supra note 38 at 1034 (citing Dan Christensen, No
More Instant Plea Deals, Says Public Defender, Daily Bus. Rev., June 6, 2005,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? id=1117789520360).
50
See id. at 1034-36 (citing systemic failures in Georgia, Virginia, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, and North Dakota). Lawyers were known for proceeding to trial
without interviewing alibi witnesses, and in some cases the defendants
themselves. See id. at 1035.
51
See id; see generally, Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model
For Indigent Representation, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 837 (1997) (finding
federal public defenders generally have lighter workloads and more resources
then state public defenders, affording them more time to investigate each case).
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uncover and investigate weaknesses in the prosecution’s
argument.52
2.

Remedies and Compensation

Although wrongful criminal convictions are often the result of
many “wrongs” there are few civil remedies available to exonerees
to compensate them for the injuries suffered as a result of their
conviction and incarceration. Only 22 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted legislation designed to compensate the
wrongly convicted.53 Compensation amounts vary, as do caps on
total compensation available.54 In states without compensation
statutes (the majority of states in the United States) exonerees are
often provided the same aid, and is some cases less, than
parolees.55
With no general statutory system in place to provide compensation,
exonerees must try obtain personal compensation through
legislative or legal means. Few exonerees are able to lobby the
legislature for a private bill granting them compensation.56 Some
state constitutions forbid the passing of personalized legislation
entirely.57 Even when a personal compensation bill is a legal
possibility, the political connections and economic resources
52

See Backus & Marcus, supra note 38, at 1036 (discussing then Attorney
General Jannet Reno’s conception of proper defense attorney conduct and the
system’s failure to deliver it to all defendants).
53
See Innocence Project, Know the Cases: After Exoneration,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/After-Exoneration.php (last visited Mar.
18, 2008) (noting states offer some form of compensation, though not
necessarily at the level advocates would deem sufficient).
54
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§4900-4906 (West 2000) (calling for
compensation of $100 per day of wrongful incarceration); with MONT. CODE
ANN. §53-1-214 (offering only educational aid); and N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS ACT
§8-b (McKinney 1984) (clearly stating that there is no maximum amount that a
pardoned or exonerated person may collect). Some states do not place numerical
limits on compensation but rather invoke legal ideas of actual damages and
reasonableness. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN & PROC. §10-501(West 1963)
(providing compensation for actual damages to an a wrongly incarcerated
individual); see also W.VA. CODE §14-2-13(1987) (awarding “fair and
reasonable” damages to the wrongly convicted).
55
See Lopez, supra note 40, at 669 (“For [the wrongly convicted’s] time and
trouble in prison, the State of Louisiana gave him what every inmate receives
upon being released from prison, whether guilty of the crime charged or not-ten
dollars and a denim jacket”); see also AFTER INNOCENCE (American Film
Foundation 2005) (interviewing exonerees who were not given job training, job
placement or health care coverage that parolees received).
56
See Bernhard, supra note 30, at 94 (citing first reason private legislation is
often unattainable).
57
See id. (citing second reason private legislation is out of reach for most
criminal defendants).
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needed to sustain a lengthy lobbying process make private
legislation implausible for most exonerees.58
Recent case surveys suggest that more and more exonerees are
filing § 1983 suits to recover for the injuries they sustained as a
result of their wrongful conviction and incarceration. 59 Nearly
50,000 federal civil rights actions commenced in 2006.60 Because
the Justice Department simply groups § 1983 with all other federal
civil rights claims it is virtually impossible to ascertain the exact
number of wrongful conviction § 1983 cases that have been filed.
Nevertheless, studies suggests that § 1983 claims make up between
seventy and ninety percent of these claims. Thus, even if one were
to accept the low end of this estimation, this means that 35,000 §
1983 claims were filed in 2006 alone.61 Although exonerees’
“wrongful conviction” claims currently account for only a small
percentage of these § 1983 claims, in the absence of other forms of
relief, scholars predict a rise in the number of § 1983 “wrongful
conviction” cases as DNA evidence exonerates more individuals. 62
III.

§ 1983 JURISPRUDENCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS

58

See id. (citing third reason private legislation is not a realistic remedy for
wrongful convictions).
59
See Garrett, supra note 36, at 42 (attributing rise in § 1983 cases to new
developments in constitutional law and forensic science). The availability of
DNA testing since the mid-1990s has transformed evidence originally thought to
implicate the defendant under more primitive scientific techniques into
scientifically certain exculpatory evidence. See id. Large verdicts against
municipal officials have been more common with the influx of DNA evidence,
thereby enticing defendants to bring suits and push our ideas of constitutional
protection in the criminal justice system. See id.
60
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 2007, TABLE C-2A, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS – CIVIL CASES
COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12
MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 THROUGH 2007, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02ASep07.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2008) (reporting all cases commenced in U.S. District Courts over past
five years). This number consists of both general federal civil rights claims as
well as civil rights petitions filled by prisoners. Id. Nevertheless, The total
number of federal civil rights cases commenced each year has steadily declined
since 2002, though the number of prisoner petitions has grown. Id. and C-2
tables 2002-05.
61
See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES (4th ed. vol. 1 2008). (generating estimate of § 1983 claims based on
government reports). Using estimates based on Schwartz evaluation of 1993
statistics, estimates of the total number of §1983 claims must be derived from
both the “other” category of federal civil rights claims and prisoner petitions
based on civil rights violations. See id.
62
See Garrett, supra note 36, at 42 (citing DNA evidence as predominant
reason for rise in § 1983 claims).
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As discussed in Part II, there are a number of reasons why a person
may be convicted of a crime of which he is innocent. From this,
one might surmise that there is no shortage of potential defendants
against whom an exoneree can bring a federal civil suit. For
example, in William Harris, the teenager discussed in the vignette
at the beginning of this piece, filed a civil suit against, inter alia,
the Kanawha County Sheriff’s Department, Fred Zain, the blood
serologist who testified against him at trial (and an employee of the
West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory), and Deputy John
W. Johnson, a sheriff in the Kanawha County Sheriff Department
who testified at Harris’s criminal trial about the strength of the
victim’s eyewitness testimony.63 And while several people often
contribute to a single wrongful conviction, to prevail in a § 1983,
an exonoree must prove that at least one of the named defendants
deprived him of a federally protected right. As discussed in the
following pages, this is not always an easy task.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to give plaintiffs a federal form
of relief against a person acting under color of state law who
deprives the plaintiff of a protected right.64 It reads in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of [state law]
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person .
. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . .65
To obtain relief a plaintiff must prove (1) that she has been
deprived of a constitutional or federal statutory right and (2) that
the person who deprived her of that right was acting under the
color of state law.66 Typically, exonerees seeking a § 1983 remedy
for their arrest and conviction allege a deprivation a Fourth
Amendment right and/or a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
63

Complaint at ___, Harris v. Kanawha County, No. _ (filed _).
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (noting “the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens . . .”).
65
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
64

66

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). As discussed in Part IV, infra, claims
for monetary relief require additional showings.
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substantive due process clause.67 As discussed in the previous
section, most erroneous convictions result from a series of actions
that begin before the plaintiff is arrested and continue through (and
sometime well-past) the criminal trial.68 This portion of the article
argues that the serial nature of constitutional injuries in wrongful
convictions cases often makes it difficult to fit these claims into the
Court’s § 1983 rubric.
As the Court explained in Baker v. McCollan, § 1983 “is not itself
a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.”69 Accordingly,
it is improper for a plaintiff to allege that the defendants “violated
§ 1983.”70 § 1983 only provides the remedy – the plaintiff must
find his “right” elsewhere.71 Furthermore, in Graham v. Connor,
the Court took the “right identification” requirement one step
further.72 There, the Court held "where a particular Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be
the guide for analyzing these claims.” 73 In short, a plaintiff must
identify a specific right of which he was deprived and he should
only cast his argument as a Fourteenth Substantive Due Process
violation when the Bill of Rights does not provide protection from
the alleged conduct.
Again, most § 1983 claims for wrongful convictions and
incarcerations allege that the defendant violated plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rights.74 Nevertheless, it is not always easy to determine whether a
specific act implicates the Fourth of Fourteenth Amendment.
67

See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Alfred
Castellano sought damages for his wrongful conviction of arson, asserting
claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.”); Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d (W. D. Va. 2004).
68
See, infra, Part II. Harris’s case illustrates this exact point. See, infra, pages
1-2 and accompanying notes. The “causes” of Harris conviction and
incarceration began before Harris was even arrested when police questioned the
victim using suggestive techniques and continued well after Harris incarceration
when the prosecution repeatedly failed to turn over the remaining DNA
evidence for additional testing. Id.
69
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979).
70
See id.
71
Id.
72
490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).
73
Id.
74
See, e.g., Castellano, 352 F.3d at 942; Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp.
2d 692 (W. D. Va. 2004). There are two categories of Fourth Amendment
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In Albright v. Oliver, the plaintiff, Kevin Albright, was arrested for
selling a substance that “looked like” cocaine. 75 Illinois officials’
decision to arrest Albright was problematic in several different
respects. First, the state’s primary witness against Albright Velda
Moore, a paid undercover informant, was especially unreliable.76
The “drugs” she reportedly bought was simple baking soda. 77
Furthermore, the person she identified as the alleged drug dealer,
John Albright Jr., a 60-year-old retired pharmacist, did not match
the description of Moore had provided to Officer Oliver.78
Nevertheless, when Oliver realized that Moore had been mistaken
and he had obtained an arrest warrant for the wrong person, rather
than obtaining a new warrant, he simply scratched out the name on
the warrant and replaced it with the “right” name. 79 Even more
problematic, the offense for which Albright was eventually
arrested, selling a look a like substance, was not even a crime
under the applicable state law.80
Eventually, “the court dismissed the criminal action on the ground
the charge did not state an offense.”81 Although Albright was
claims. First, the plaintiff may allege that the seizure was unreasonable because
police officers used excessive force during the course of the seizure. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, (1989). Second, exonerees may allege that the
seizure was unreasonable because the arresting officers did not have probable
cause. This Article focuses on the causal relationship between a constitutional
breach and a wrongful conviction. In cases where police officers use excessive
force during arrest or seizure to coerce a suspect’s confession, a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim could result in a wrongful conviction.
Nevertheless, the “actual injury” alleged in most excessive force claims are
bodily injuries, not the types of damages stemming from a wrongful conviction
and incarceration. As such, Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are
beyond the scope of this Article.
75
510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994).
76
Id. In 1987, after being released from drug rehabilitation, Officer Oliver and
Velda Moore entered into a deal in which Oliver would protect Moore from a
cocaine dealer so long as she acted as an undercover informant. According to
the civil record, Moore was to “make deals” with drug dealers and Officer
Oliver “gave Moore money with which to make the purchases and agreed to pay
her $50 to $75 for each purchase of a controlled substance that she reported.”
According to the record, none of the 50 drug transactions that Moore claimed to
participate in resulted in a conviction. Albright, 510 U.S. 266 (United States
Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief).
77
Albright, 510 U.S. at n.1.
78
Id.
79
Albright, 510 U.S. 266 (United States Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief).
Officer Albright scratched out two names before eventually entering in Roger
Albright’s name. See id.
80
81

Albright, 510 U.S. at 268
Id. at 269.
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never tried and convicted, he was arrested, required to post bond,
and incurred legal fees.
Approximately two years after the
charges against him were dismissed, Albright filed a § 1983 claim
alleging that respondents deprived him of substantive rights
secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by initiating a criminal prosecution against him without probable
cause or an objectively reasonable belief in probable cause. The
trial court granted Officer Oliver’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Albright appealed and the appellate court affirmed the decision.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s
opinion on different grounds – specifically, that “the Fourth
Amendment, and not substantive due process [was the appropriate
amendment], under which petitioner Albright's claim must be
judged.”82 Furthermore, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
concluded that, in the absence of a criminal sentence, “the only
deprivation of life, liberty or property, if any, consisted of
petitioner's pretrial arrest” and, as such, the only procedures ‘due’
to Albright were those specified under the Fourth Amendment.83
In short, the plurality rejected Petitioner Albright’s § 1983 claim
because he presented it as substantive due process deprivation
rather than a Fourth Amendment violation and “initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution” “without probable cause”
implicates the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process clause.
The Court, however, has held that certain actions that occur in the
later phases of the criminal justice process implicate the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.84
Most of the acts that courts have analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process clause occur within the scope

82

Id. at 271.
Id. at 275 (J. Scalia concurring); see also U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (“The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”)
84
The criminal justice process consists of several different stages. See Niki
Kukles, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 1,
22-23 (explaining that early stages of a criminal case include, inter alia,
issuance of an arrest warrant, arrest, arraignment, and bail hearing); Angela J.
Davis, Crime and Punishment Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice
System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1674 (1996) (noting that various stages the
criminal process include arrest, prosecution, trial, and sentencing).
83
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of the trial.
For example, In Miller v. Pate, the prosecution
continually referred to a pair of bloody shorts as it described the
brutal murder of a young girl by the defendant. It was later
determined, however, that the prosecution knew that the shorts
were actually stained with paint.86 The court held that a prosecutor
who knowingly presents false evidence at trial deprives the
criminal defendant of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process rights.87 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that
prosecutor’s reference to a criminal defendant’s prior conviction
during the sentencing phase of the defendant’s criminal trial
violated the defendant’s substantive due process rights. 88
Combined, the Courts’ opinions in Albright and Miller seem to
indicate that the decision to “initiate and pursue” a criminal
prosecution implicates the Fourth Amendment while decisions and
acts that occur during trial implicate the substantive due process
class. Yet, obviously, at least some of the acts that contribute to
wrongful convictions, such as unduly suggestive lineups and
coerced confessions, occur after the criminal defendant has been
arrested but before his trial. Furthermore, most substantive due
process violations that occur “at trial” involve at least some
misconduct prior to trial.89 It remains unclear whether these acts
should be analyzed under the substantive due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Fourth Amendment.
Following the rationale of Albright v. Oliver, this conclusion
should depend on the Court’s definition of seizure. If the act
occurred during the seizure phase of the process, the claim should
85

See Albright 510 U.S. at 299 n. 15 (J. Stevens, dissenting) (“Our cases make
clear that procedural regularity notwithstanding, the Due Process Clause is
violated by the knowing use of perjured testimony . . .”)
86
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding prosecutorial conduct created due
process violation). The Court noted that even though all parties knew the shorts
were stained with paint, not blood, it was the repeated mischaracterization of the
shorts by the prosecutor that violated due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 4-5.
87
Id. at 7 (“the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.”).
88
Rogers v. Lynaugh, 848 F.2d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that
prosecutions mention of prior convictions unfairly shifted the jury’s focus away
from the facts of the case and toward an impermissible assessment of the
defendant himself even though the prior conviction may be relevant to
sentencing under Texas law).
89
See, e.g., Castellano, 352 F.3d at 942 (discussing liability in § 1983 wrongful
conviction case in which plaintiff alleged defendants fabricated evidence before
his arrest and perjured themselves regarding the evidence at trial); Washington
v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 692 (W. D. Va. 2004) (alleging defendants deprived
plaintiff of constitutional rights when coerced confession before his arrest and
testified as to the reliability of that confession at trial).
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be treated as a Fourth Amendment question, otherwise, the Due
Process clause governs. The difficulty with this approach, as one
might surmise, is how to determine when a seizure begins and
ends.90 Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence in Albright highlights the
struggle to parse out at what point one’s detention stops being
merely an unlawful seizure and becomes a more general
deprivation of liberty.91 Justice Ginsberg traces the history of
bailment at common law and concludes that though one may leave
the custody of the police, they are by no means free of restraint.92
Ginsberg reasons that because criminal defendants awaiting trial
outside of a correctional institution are required to appear at court,
they remain under the jurisdiction, carry with them the burdens of
pending prosecution, and accordingly, remained “seized”, as the
term is used in the Fourth Amendment.93
Rather than wrestling with the definition of seizure, the Seventh
Circuit has distinguished Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
malicious prosecution/wrongful conviction claims from one
another by focusing on whether “the situation [is one] in which a
person is being held pursuant to a judicial determination . . . [or is
one] in which he is being held without such a determination.” 94 In
the former, the Due Process clause applies while the Fourth
90

In many ways, this is an old argument in a new context. For years, courts
have debated whether excessive force that occurs after a person is arrested but
before he is arraigned should be treated as a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
violation. See Tiffany Ritchie, A Legal Twilight Zone: From the Fourth to the
Fourteenth Amendment, What Constitutional Approach is Afforded a Pretrial
Detainee?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 613, 613 (2003). In Graham v. Connor, the Court
held that where “the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or
investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” 490 U.S. at 393.
Nevertheless, circuit courts remain split as to how determine when the arrest
and/or seizure ends. See, Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161-64 (4th Cir.
1997) (applying Fourteenth Amendment after arrest ends); Cottrell v. Caldwell,
85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); cf Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713
(8th Cir. 2000); Barrie v. Grand Country, 119 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1997);
Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1996).
91
See Albright, 510 U.S. at 277-79 (J. Ginsberg, concurring)
92
Id.
93
Id. (J. Ginsberg concurring) (finding seizure continues after custody ends).
94

Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 792 (7th Cir. 1992). In Villanova, the
plaintiff was civilly committed against his will and brought an § 1983 action
against the state psychiatrist. Id. Plaintiff claimed that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because there was no probable cause to commit him and
that his Fourteenth Amendment due process right was violated when he was
held for an unnecessarily long period. Id. Eventually, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had been deprived of neither his Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id.
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Amendment continues to govern the latter.95 Similarly, in Reed,
the Seventh Circuit distinguished between “wrongful arrest
claims” and “malicious prosecution claims.” 96 There the court
concluded that wrongful arrest and detention claims occur when a
person is arrested without probable cause and are governed by the
Fourth Amendment and that malicious prosecution claims concern
the government’s treatment of a suspect between the time of the
suspect’s probable cause hearing and his acquittal or detention and
are governed by the Due Process Clause.97
While these approaches may be more nuanced than the Court’s
approach in Albright, they still fail to account for conduct that
begins during one phase of the criminal process and spills into
subsequent phases. For example, where, as in Harris, a forensic
scientist manufactures evidence before a suspect is arrested and
then testifies as to the reliability of that evidence at trial. 98
Presumably, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Villanova and
Reed conduct that occurred before there was a judicial
determination of probable cause would be governed by the Fourth
Amendment but the scientist’s testimony regarding the reliability
of the evidence would be judged under the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard.99
As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, this complicates questions
of causation because the plaintiff must prove that constitutional
95

Id.
Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing
Circuit’s understanding of custody prior to Albright and noting that Albright
“cast considerable doubt” as to which constitutional amendments govern
malicious prosecution claims) (1994)). Reed brought a § 1983 suit when he
was acquitted on murder charges after being held for twenty-three months. Id.
at 1051-52.
97
The Seventh Circuit’s approach in Reed, however, does not seem to account
for those cases in which the arrest was made with an arrest warrant. See id.
98
Harris Complaint, supra note 64, at __.
99
Reed, 77 F.3d at 1051-52 (distinguishing between “wrongful arrest” claims
and “malicious prosecution” claims). Depending on how a court chooses to
distinguish between Fourth Amendment and Due Process violations, a similar
problem might emerge when the alleged violated concerns an omission, for
example, when the plaintiff alleges that the prosecution has failed to turn over
evidence favorable to the defense. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84
(1963) (holding suppression of any material evidence favorable to defendant
violated due process). Was the court to apply Justice Ginsberg’s concurring
opinion in Albright, than the Fourth Amendment would seem to govern.
Albright, 510 U.S. at 277-79 (J. Ginsberg, concurring) (finding seizure
continues after custody ends). Nevertheless, regardless of when the supposed
omission occurred courts have consistently treated this as Due Process violation.
SEE E.G. INSERT STRING CITATION.
96
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deprivation causes his injury to prevail in a § 1983 claim for
monetary damages. However, where the court treats continuous
actions as separate violations the defendant can argue that the
plaintiff’s incarceration was not a result of the evidence fabricated
before trial (a Fourth Amendment violation) but was caused by the
introduction of the evidence at trial (a Due Process violation).
Accordingly, in the absence of a causal link, the defendant is not
liable (at least for monetary damages) for his Fourth Amendment
(pre-trial) violation.
In at least one case, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the problem of
causation and multiple constitutional violations by simply focusing
on the Due Process violation --- i.e., the conduct occurring at trial.
In Washington v. Wilmore, the plaintiff, Earl Washington Jr.,
sought monetary damages for his conviction and incarceration after
DNA proved that he had not committed the crime of which he was
convicted.100 Washington alleged that the investigating officer,
Special Agent Wilmore, had violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by coercing his confession and had deprived him of his Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights by testifying as to the
accuracy of the confession at trial.101 Clearly, the court could have
treated the confession and testimony as two separate events.102
Instead, the court focused on the conclusion that Wilmore
presented fabricated evidence at trial when he testified to the
accuracy of Washington’s confession. 103 Furthermore, the court
used evidence of the coercion to conclude that Wilmore knew the
evidence was fabricated. From this the court concluded that
Wilmore had knowingly presented fabricated evidence at trial in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
clause.104
This approach, however, is not without its problems. As a general
rule, a § 1983 defendant is immune from damages that stem from
his role in the judicial process.
This includes judges,105
106
107
prosecutors,
and witnesses.
Thus, police officers who

100

407 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id.
102
See Castellano, 352 F.3d at 959.
103
Washington, 407 F.3d at 282.
104
Id
105
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, at 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more
solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction”).
106
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-423 (1976) (holding that “a state
prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution” was not amenable to suit under § 1983).
101
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introduce fabricated evidence at trial by testifying to the accuracy
of scientific tests or the reliability of a witness’s identification or
suspect’s confession are shielded from liability. 108
In the end, courts’ recent approaches to § 1983’s “constitutional
deprivation” requirement forces exonorees to classify the alleged
conduct as a specific constitutional violation. This may comport
with the statutory language of § 1983 but it tends to place an
exonoree “on the horns of a dilemma.” If the plaintiff focuses on
the defendants’ conduct at trial he is unlikely to recovery damages
from the defendant because, again, most participants in the judicial
process are shielded from monetary liability by some form of
judicial immunity.109 On the other hand, as is discussed in the next
section, if he attempts to classify his claim as a Fourth Amendment
violation --- i.e., he focuses on the defendant’s pretrial conduct --the court may not permit damages incurred after the trial begins,
which, obviously, is where most injuries are sustained in wrongful
conviction cases.
IV.

THE TWO FACES OF CAUSATION

Even if an exonoree is able to navigate through the maze that
divides Fourth and Fourteenth amendment violations and proves
that a state official (or a person acting under the color of state law)
deprived him a federally protected right, he is not necessarily
entitled to relief under § 1983. Technically, a § 1983 claim
consists of just two elements: (1) that a person acting under the
color of state law (2) deprived the plaintiff (or caused the plaintiff
to be deprived) of a federally protected right.110 Nevertheless, if a
plaintiff establishes both of these elements he is simply entitled to
declaratory judgment or nominal monetary damages.111 Obviously,
most § 1983 plaintiffs sue for a specific remedy112 and, as one
might imagine, the majority of § 1983 litigants seek monetary
compensation.113
107

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983) (holding that witnesses are
absolutely immune from damages liability under § 1983 when liability is
premised based on their trial testimony, even when witness has perjured
himself.)
108
See id.
109
See, supra notes 106-108.
110
Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640 (“By the plain terms of § 1983, two-and only twoallegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.”) .
111
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978) (“we believe that the denial
of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without
proof of actual injury”).
112
113
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So, while on it’s face, § 1983 only requires the plaintiff to prove
two elements, with the exception of declaratory judgments, in most
§ 1983 cases the plaintiff is actually required to prove additional
elements. The first portion of this section briefly explains why,
under current § 1983 jurisprudence, most § 1983 claims actually
consist of more than two elements. Part A goes on to explain that
causation plays two separate roles in § 1983 litigation, which, as
explained below, I refer to as “statutory causation” and “damages
causation.” Part B of this Section provides an overview of form of
causation most often discussed in § 1983 litigation – that of
statutory causation. As I explain in this section, in most § 1983
litigation it is almost intuitive that government official being sued
caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a federally protected right.
“Statutory causation” only becomes a point of contention in the
few cases where the plaintiff alleges that a municipality or
supervisor caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a federally
protected right. Part B, which is the focus of this piece, discusses
how courts have treated “damages causation” in § 1983 claims for
monetary damages.
A.

The Elements of § 1983 Actions for Monetary Damages

In Carey v. Piphus, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who
alleges deprivation of a Procedural Due Process constitutional right
must prove that the deprivation resulted in an actual injury if he is
to receive more than nominal monetary damages.114 Shortly
thereafter, the Court extended Carey’s holding to all § 1983 cases
for monetary damages, regardless of the alleged underlying
constitutional deprivation.115 Thus, to receive monetary damages
all § 1983 plaintiffs must prove that they suffered an actual injury.
Explicitly, the Carey line of cases only adds one additional
element. Namely that the plaintiff seeking monetary damages
pursuant to § 1983 violation prove an actual injury. Implicitly,
however, these holdings also insert a causation element into in
constitutional tort cases for monetary relief. A careful examination
of the case reveals that, to recover significant monetary damages
114

Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-267 (1978) (“we believe that the denial of procedural
due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual
injury”). Under a narrow interpretation of the Court’s holding, a plaintiff must
only establish “actual injury” when he alleges that he was deprived of a
procedural due process right.
115
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309-310
(1986) (extending Carey’s actual injury requirement to all § 1983 cases
regardless of the underlying constitutional violation.).
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under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) an actual injury and (2)
that the defendant’s constitutional violation caused this injury.
Thus, a plaintiff seeking monetary damages under § 1983 must
prove four elements: (1) that a person acting under the color of
state law (2) deprived or caused him to be deprived of a
constitutional (or federally protected statutory right) (3) that the
breach was the proximate cause (4) of the plaintiff’s actual
injury.116
Most legal scholarship discussing the role of causation in § 1983
litigation focuses on municipal liability and the requirement that
the defendant cause the plaintiff to be deprived of a federally
protected right.117 Given the basic statutory language of § 1983,
this is clearly a necessary element for liability. Because of its
statutory origin, I refer to this element as “statutory causation.”
Nevertheless, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, after
Carey, causation plays two important roles in § 1983 litigation for
monetary damages.118 In addition to the causation element
established in the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs seeking a
monetary remedy (beyond nominal damages) must also prove that
the alleged constitutional deprivation caused an actual injury. In
short, monetary compensation also requires a causal link between
the constitutional deprivation and the actual injury. Given its
nature, I refer to this form of causation as “damages causation.”

B.

Statutory Causation – “subjects or causes to be
subjected”

As the statutory language makes plain, causation is an inherent part
of the deprivation element of a § 1983 claim – the defendant must
“subject or cause [another] to be subjected” to the deprivation of a
federally protected right.119 In most cases, the plaintiff establishes
116

Lockhart-Bembery v. Town of Wayland Police Dept., 447 F.Supp.2d, 11
(D. Mass. 2006) (“[I]n order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that 1) the defendant acted under color of
state law, 2) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of her rights secured by the
Constitution and and 3) such actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries and damages.”).
117
See, e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, “Or Causes to be Subjected”: The Role of
Causation in § 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187
(1988).
118

Which party is responsible for proving or disproving causation is a different,
albeit important question.
119
See, generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). In Monell v. Department of Social
Services of City of New York, the Court concluded the following:
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“statutory causation” by simply proving that the defendant engaged
in conduct that violated the constitution.120 When a plaintiff
proves the defendant engaged in the conduct, the conduct violated
the constitution there is no real question whether the statutory
causation element has been met. For example, in the Harris case
referenced at the beginning of this article, there is little question
that Zain, the forensic scientist who analyzed the blood and semen
evidence in the case, caused Harris to be deprived of a
constitutional right.121 Similarly, “statutory causation” is relative
clear when, through policy or custom, a municipality orders its
employees to engage in conduct that violates the Constitution.122
The most difficult questions of “statutory causation” arise when
the plaintiff alleges that a municipality or supervisor did not
command or compel another’s conduct but, nevertheless, through
inaction caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a constitutional right.
In Monell, the Court held that a municipality would be liable when
“official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
tort.”123 It is important to understand that these are two separate
elements. § 1983 municipal liability requires prove (1) official
[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the
same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress
did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor. . . Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B “caused” A to
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend
§ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
(1978); see also 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF § 1983 § 3:108 (4th ed. 2005) (“As emphasized in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, the very
language of § 1983 requires causal relation between defendant’s conduct and
plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.”)
120
See, generally, Kritchevsky, supra note 118.
121
See, generally, CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1. Rather, the legal debate
would likely focus on (1) whether Zain “doctored” the evidence and (2) if so,
whether such conduct amounts to a constitutional violation. Similarly,
“statutory causation” is relatively clear when, through policy or custom, a
municipality orders its employees to engage in conduct that violates the
constitution.
122
Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown
520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (“the conclusion that the action taken or directed by
the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will
also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury
of which the plaintiff”).
123
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
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municipal policy that (2) caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a
constitutional right.
There are, essentially, four ways that a plaintiff may establish
“policy”124 A municipality is clearly liable when it promulgates a
policy that compels its officials to violate the constitution.125 A
municipality may also be liable when an employee commits an
unconstitutional act pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom
– i.e., when the act is compelled by an unofficial municipal
policy.126 Similarly, municipal liability is triggered when a
plaintiff establishes that the constitutional tort was committed,
compelled, or ratified by an official with final policy-making
authority.127 Finally, the court has held that a municipality may be
liable for a facially constitutional policy custom or practice when
the policy or custom evidences a deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of its residents.128 The deliberate indifference
standard requires the plaintiff to prove a strong causal connection
between the policy, or lack thereof, and the constitutional
deprivation. To demonstrate that the municipality’s omission (i.e.,
failure to train or failure to screen employees) amounts to a
municipal policy, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
municipality’s failure to act evidences a “deliberate indifference to
124

I use the term “policy” loosely. As the court explained in City of Canton,
“[i]t may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will
actually have a policy of note taking reasonable steps to train its employees.”
Nevertheless, “where a failure to train reflects ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice
by a municipality” it may be considered a “policy” for § 1983 municipal liability
purposes. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989).
125
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-695. Although it is clear that a municipality is
liable for constitutional deprivations resulting from unconstitutional policies, it
is far less clear what evidence a plaintiff must offer to establish the presence of a
policy. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)
(addressing whether a decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion
amounts to a policy capable of triggering § 1983 municipal liability);
126
Monell, 436, U.S. at 690-91 (holding that municipality “may be sued for
constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official decision making channels.”)
127
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (holding that only
decisions made by those officials who have final policymaking authority may
only be attributed to the municipal, thereby triggering rendering the municipality
liable for “its” conduct); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981) (If the decision to adopt that particular course of action is properly made
by that government's authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of
official government “policy” as that term is commonly understood.); Pembaur,
475 U.S. 469 (1986).
128
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“the inadequacy of police training may
serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.”).
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the rights of persons with whom the [governmental officials] come
into contact.”129
In other words, (and somewhat counterintuitively), “no policy” can equal a policy when the failure to
adopt a new or different policy reflects a deliberate indifference to
the rights of citizens and inhabitants. Arguably, when a plaintiff
successfully proves that “no policy” equals “policy” “statutory
causation” may be assumed because the deliberate indifference
standard incorporates the proximate cause test.130
Most circuit courts also have recognized supervisor liability in §
1983 actions.131 As noted in the previous section, a defendant who
“subjects or causes to be subjected” another to the deprivation of
his constitutional rights is liable. As worded, § 1983 does not
require personal participation to be a predicate for § 1983 liability.
129

Id. at 388.
Board of County Commissioners, 520 U.S. at 409. In Board of County
Commissioners, the Court explained the relationship between the deliberate
indifference standard and causation as follows:
The likelihood that the situation will recur and the
predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle
that situation will violate citizens' rights could justify a finding
that policymakers' decision not to train the officer reflected
“deliberate indifference” to the obvious consequence of the
policymakers' choice-namely, a violation of a specific
constitutional or statutory right. The high degree of
predictability may also support an inference of causation-that
the municipality's indifference led directly to the very
consequence that was so predictable.
Id; see also, Kritchevsky, supra note 118, at 1226-27 (noting courts applying a
“fault model” “are able to avoid conducting a causation analysis in each case
because they have required plaintiffs to prove municipal toleration or
encouragement of unconstitutional conduct in order to establish the existence of
a policy or custom.”).
131
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1297-98 (1986) (recognizing
that vicarious liability does not apply in a claim brought under § 1983). See also
Polk Co. v. Dodson, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453 (1981); Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768
F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.1985)(per curiam); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304
(5th Cir. 1987); Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th
Cir.1982); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.1994). The
Second Circuit has stated that “Supervisor liability in a § 1983 action depends
on a showing of some personal responsibility, and cannot rest on respondeat
superior.” Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2003)(citation
omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that, “It is axiomatic, in § 1983
actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of
respondeat superior.” H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th
Cir.1986) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036
(1978)); See also Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, (1981); But see
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Hesselgesser v.
Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971): “If state law imposes liability upon a public
official for the acts of his subordinates, vicarious liability can also be imposed
upon him under § 1983).
130
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The Supreme Court has stated that, “[a] causal connection, or an
affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the
official sued is necessary.” 132 The causation inquiry must be
individualized and examine the duties and responsibilities of each
individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have
caused a constitutional deprivation.133 Most circuit courts, with
mild variations, recognize that the causal connection can be
established by direct personal participation in the deprivation or by
other culpable behavior such as setting in motion a series of acts by
others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would
cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.134
C. “Damages Causation” – Causation as a link between
the Defendant’s constitutional breach and the
plaintiff’s actual injury.
With the exception of cases where the defendant is a supervisor or
municipality, statutory causation can be assumed so long as the
plaintiff proves that the defendant engaged or through policy or
custom ordered another to engage in conduct that violated the
Constitution. Damages causation, however, may not be so easily
assumed. Legal scholars discussing Carey typically focus on the
“actual injury” aspect of the decision; 135 yet, Carey’s holding has
important implications regarding the role of damages causation in
§ 1983 cases.
In Carey, several school students sued their school board alleging
the board suspended them from school without due process, in
violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.136 At trial, the
district court concluded that the students had, in fact, been
deprived of their due process rights.137 However, the court held
132

Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S.Ct. 598, 603-07 (1976).
See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983); Sims v. Adams,
537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted) (“The proper question is . . .
whether the complaint adequately alleges the requisite causal connection
between the supervisory defendants' actions and a deprivation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights.”).
134
McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to impose
liability on supervisor in the absence of evidence that he participated directly in
the hearings that were the root cause of the plaintiff’s constitutional
deprivation); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496 2nd Cir. 1994; Richardson v. Goord,
347 F.3d 431, 435 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“Mere linkage in the prison chain of
command is insufficient to implicate a state commissioner of corrections or a
prison superintendent in a § 1983 claim.”)
135
See, e.g., Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration
after Carey v. Phipus, 93 HARV. L. REV 966 (1980).
136
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978).
137
Id. at 251-52.
133
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that the plaintiffs were only entitled to nominal damages because
they had failed to prove they suffered actual injuries as a result of
the deprivations.138 On appeal, the circuit court reversed and held
“even if the District Court found on remand that respondent’s
suspensions were justified, they were entitled to recover substantial
nonpunitive damages simply because they had been denied
procedural due process.”139 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine “whether, in an action under § 1983 for the
deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that
he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover
substantial nonpunitive damages.”140
Quoting from Law of Torts, the Court noted, “the cardinal
principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of
compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by the defendant’s
breach.”141 From this, the Court concluded that § 1983 damages
awards should be based upon compensation and “substantial
damages should be awarded only to compensate for actual injury
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish
malicious deprivations of rights.” 142 Furthermore, the Court stated
the following regarding the relationship between the damages
award and the constitutional deprivation:
In order to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules
governing compensation for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights should be
tailored to the interested protected by the particular
right in question – just as the common law rules of
damages themselves were defined by the interests
protected in the various branches of tort law.
143

In other words, there must be a causal connection between the
injuries sustained and the constitutional deprivation - what I refer
to as damages causation. This causal connection mirrors common
law tort principles of causation. And, accordingly, requires proof
of both legal and factual causation.
The damages causation requirement set forth in Carey, as well as
the importation of tort common law causation principles has
important implications to § 1983 cases, particularly those cases in
138

Id.
Id. at 252.
140
Id. at 253.
141
Id. at 254-55.
142
Carey, 435 U.S. at 266.
143
Id. at 258-59.
139
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which the plaintiff claims he was convicted and incarcerated as a
result of a pre-trial constitutional breach. Courts have used both
factual causation and legal causation as a way to limit defendant’s
liability in § 1983 wrongful conviction cases.
1.
Factual Causation
As the name implies, factual causation, or cause in fact, is the
evidentiary link between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s
injury.144 “The most widely accepted test for making that inquiry
is the ‘but-for-test.’ The but-for-test asks whether the injury in suit
would occurred if the defendant had not engaged in the wrongful
conduct at issue”145
The “but for” test is a fair indication of factual causation in many
cases. Yet, as one might intuit, the but-for-test presents both
practical and conceptual difficulties in some cases because it
requires the fact-finder to hypothesize whether the plaintiff would
have been harmed absent the defendant’s conduct. 146 Several
problems may arise in this “imagine if” analysis, most of which are
variations on the classic problem of multiple actors.147
144

Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1734, 17591760. Although some legal scholars have argued that court’s should consider
defendant’s overall conduct when making the cause in fact inquiry, “the courts
follow the tortious-aspect approach” and, accordingly, “ focus the causal inquiry
on the tortious aspect of the defendant’s conduct.” Id.
145
David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1765, 1769 (1997) (explaining that the but-for test is a five-step process: “(a)
identify the injuries in suit; (b) identify the wrongful conduct; (c) mentally
correct the wrongful conduct to the extent necessary to make it lawful, leaving
everything else the same; (d) ask whether the injuries would still have occurred
had the defendant been acting correctly in that sense; (e) answer the question.”)
146
See id. (“In a rigorous philosophical sense we can never the answer to the
but-for question, because it asks about a state of affairs that never existed.”).
147
First, the plaintiff might clearly have been injured as the result of a breach
but is unable to establish which of several defendants breached a duty owed to
the plaintiff. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.App.2d 43, (applying
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor where plaintiff suffered injury during surgical
procedure and was unable to identify which particular defendant caused the
injury). Additionally, a plaintiff may be able to prove that several actors
breached a duty but may not be able to prove which actor caused his particular
injury. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980) (applying
market share theory of liability where multiple manufacturers produced product
that resulted in birth defects when ingested by pregnant women). In some
cases, the plaintiff will be able to prove that both actors committed a breach but,
alone, each breach would have resulted in the plaintiff’s injury; consequently,
neither defendant is the “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault St. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46
(Minn. 1920) (applying “material or substantial” factor test where multiple fires,
only one started by the defendant, combined to burn the plaintiff's property).
Finally, the plaintiff may be able to prove that multiple defendants committed

30

RAVENELL

DRAFT
PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE, OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S
PERMISSION

As indicated in Section II, when a person is convicted of and
incarcerated for a crime of which he was innocent, it is often the
result of a culmination of factors. Accordingly, in the hypothetical
world of “but for” causation, it may not be clear that, absent the
defendant’s constitutional violation, the plaintiff would not have
been convicted.148 A careful study of the Harris case (discussed at
the beginning of this Article), demonstrates that Harris’ conviction
was the result of many factors:
Four components led to the wrongful conviction of
William primary Harris . . . . First, the victim
appears to have been repeatedly exposed to
suggestive interviewing techniques . . . . Second,
whether unintentionally or not, the police or the
prosecutors appear to have withheld from the
defense and from the jury crucial information that
was favorable to the defense and necessary to
ensure fairness at trial.
Third, erroneous or
exaggerated forensic science was communicated to
the jury in a manner that gave a false aura of
scientific expertise to the prosecutions case, Finally,
the false scientific testimony and the erroneous
eyewitness identification appear to have affected
one another, resulting in cross-contamination and a
false reinforcement that enhanced the errors and
blinded police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors to the
weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.
149

Even assuming the forensic scientist deprived Harris of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when he “doctored” the
forensic evidence pre-trial,150 it will be difficult for Harris to prove
that “but for” the forensic evidence, he would not have been
convicted and incarcerated – a fact-finder could conclude that the

multiple breaches of duty and that he suffered multiple injuries but the plaintiff
is unable to prove which defendant caused which particular injury. See, e.g.,
Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 183 (1997) (discussing apportioning liability
in “double impact” cases).
148
CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1 at __.
149
Id. at _.
150
As discussed in greater detail in Part II, the forensic examiner should have
absolute immunity for the testimony he offered at trial. See, supra Part II
(discussing witness immunity).
Therefore, he will only be liable for
unconstitutional acts occurring outside of the courtroom. Id.

31

RAVENELL

DRAFT
PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE, OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S
PERMISSION

testimony of the eye-witnesses provided enough evidence for a
jury to convict Harris.151
For example, in Castellano the plaintiff was convicted and
incarcerated for arson.152 Shortly after his third habeas petition
was granted and the charges against him were dismissed,
Castellano filed a § 1983 suit against, inter alia, a police officer
who testified against him at trial and fabricated evidence pre-trial
that was introduced during his criminal trial.153 The plaintiff
claimed that defendants were guilty of malicious prosecution and
had denied him rights secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.154
A jury found that two of the defendants were liable for
“malicious prosecution” and awarded the Castellano $3,000,000
in compensatory damages for his conviction and injuries
stemming from that conviction and $500,000 in punitive damages
against the two defendants.155
The defendants appealed the
verdict, arguing that “the judgment against them rests on an
impermissible blend of state tort and constitutional rights and that
Castellano at best has only a Fourth Amendment claim.”156 In
response, plaintiff “urge[d] that all damages flow from the initial
wrongful arrest and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”157

151

The preponderance of evidence standard applicable in civil cases is clearly
less onerous than the harmless error standard applied in criminal appeals. See,
generally, Garrett, supra note 36. Nevertheless, to establish the necessary factual
link between the unconstitutional conduct and plaintiff’s incarceration a jury
must conclude that, absent the erroneous forensic evidence it is more likely than
not that the plaintiff would not have been convicted and incarcerated.
152
The defendants, a police officer with the City of San Antonio and his
girlfriend, Castellano’s former employee, fabricated evidence and falsely
testified in Castellano’s criminal trial for arson. The state court hearing
plaintiff’s habeas petition concluded that the defendants “collaborated together
and without their testimony and the altered tapes, there is insufficient evidence
to sustain a finding of guilt in this case.” Ex parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476,
479 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
153
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 2003).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 944.
156
Id.
157
Id. Plaintiff’s First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims were all
dismissed relatively early in the case. Id. Additionally, the magistrate judge
assigned the task of resolving the parties pre-trial motions held that the plaintiff
could only pursue his “malicious prosecution” claim under the Fourth
Amendment, not the Fourteenth.
Accordingly, only plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim went to the jury. Id.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that magistrate judge had
misinterpreted Albright when he concluded plaintiff’s claims only
implicated the Fourth Amendment.158 The circuit court reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment only “casts its protection solely over
the pretrial events of a prosecution” and that “the manufacturing of
evidence and the state's use of that evidence along with perjured
testimony to obtain Castellano's wrongful conviction indisputably
denied him rights secured by the Due Process Clause.” Thus, on
remand, the plaintiff could pursue both his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
Nevertheless, the court noted that causation could prove an
impossible hurdle to compensatory damages even if the plaintiff
proved the defendants deprived him of his Fourth Amendment
rights.159 More specifically, the court held that the defendant’s
pretrial actions (i.e., the conduct which deprived plaintiff of his
Fourth Amendment rights), did not necessarily cause plaintiff’s
subsequent conviction and incarceration.160 The court offered the
following reasoning for its conclusion:
The prosecution of this case relied on the continued
cooperation of [the defendants] at each of its
subsequent phases. . . Without the perjury at trial
there would have been no conviction, yet the
perjury at trial did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. That is, unless these events at trial are
somehow found to be a violation of Castellano's
Fourth Amendment rights, there is no constitutional
footing for a claim seeking recovery for damages
arising from the trial and wrongful conviction, as
opposed to his arrest and pretrial detention, given
the dismissal of all but Fourth Amendment
claims.161
In short, that the defendant’s pre-trial actions did not necessarily
cause plaintiff’s conviction --- the plaintiff would not have been
convicted if the defendant’s had not perjured themselves at trial.

158

Castellano, 352 F.3d at 958 (“this reading of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments was deeply flawed. It swept too wide in two directions:
simultaneously holding that Albright closed the door to any claim of a
deprivation of due process and that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
extended to events at trial.”).
159
Id. at 959.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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Although the court did not approach it as such, but-for causation
may be viewed as a five-step analysis. Professor Robertson,
explains these five steps as follows: “(a) identify the injuries in
suit; (b) identify the wrongful conduct; (c) mentally correct the
wrongful conduct to the extent necessary to make it lawful, leaving
everything else the same; (d) ask whether the injuries would still
have occurred had the defendant been acting correctly in that
sense; and (e) answer the question.” 162 Applying these five steps to
the facts of Castellano, it would seem that the defendants’ Fourth
Amendment violation is the cause-in-fact of plaintiff’s subsequent
conviction and sentence. Castellano was convicted and sentenced
for committing arson.163 The defendants fabricated evidence to
make it appear that Castellano confessed to the crime and perjured
themselves in signed affidavits.164 Based upon this information, a
judge issued a warrant and Castellano was arrested and indicted.165
In the absence of probable cause (as would seem to be the case
here) arresting plaintiff was unreasonable and in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.166 Had the defendants not fabricated
evidence and perjured themselves the plaintiff would not have
been arrested, and, consequently would not have been convicted
and sentenced for arson. In short, the defendants’ pre-arrest
actions began a chain of events that ended with the plaintiff being
sentenced to five years probation. If the defendants did not
fabricate evidence and perjure themselves to obtain the arrest
warrant, the Castellano would never have been sentenced.167
Therefore, despite the court’s conclusion to the contrary, it would
seem that the but-for test establishes the requisite cause in fact
connection between the defendants Fourth Amendment violation
and the plaintiff’s injuries.168

162

Robertson, supra note 148, at 1771.
Castellano, 352 F.3d at 943.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Albright, 510 U.S. at 274.
167
See Castellano, 352 F.3d at 943 (“The investigation led to Castellano,
largely on the testimony of Maria Sanchez and a tape recording she produced
with a recorder supplied by Fragozo.”)
168
“The plaintiff has the burden of proving the causal link between the
defendant’s wrongful conduct and plaintiff’s injuries by a preponderance of the
evidence. This means the evidence should convince the trier of fact that more
probably than not defendant’s conduct was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s harm.”
Davidson, supra note 146, at 1773-74 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 270 (5th ed. 1984). “The
fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no one can say with
absolute certainty what would have occurred had the defendant acted
otherwise.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at
269-70 (5th ed. 1984). “If as expected, under the circumstances, to produce a
163
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In contrast, applying the but-for test to the William Harris example
would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a particular
defendant was the factual cause of the Harris’s conviction and
incarceration even though it is relatively clear that each defendant
at least contributed to the harm.169 As explained in the preceding
paragraphs, Harris’s conviction was the result of at least four
factors, including witness misidentification, suggestive interview
techniques, and faulty forensic evidence.
Stated slightly
differently, the harm may have occurred even in the absence of one
constitutional violation (e.g., the presentation of fabricated
evidence at trial) breach, thereby negating “but for” causation.
Nevertheless, it is relatively clear the defendant’s actions either
enhanced the plaintiff’s injury or increased the likelihood that such
injury would occur.170
In such situations, a “substantial factor” test may resolve the
problem of establishing causation when there are multiple causes
contributing the plaintiff’s injury. The “substantial factor test”
stands for “the principle that causation exists when the defendant's
conduct is an important or significant contributor to the plaintiff's
injuries.”171 Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that this test is
permissible under current § 1983 jurisprudence. In Mt. Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle the Court holds
that § 1983 plaintiff who alleges that the defendant’s decision not
to rehire him deprived him of his First Amendment rights must
prove that his conduct was protected under the First Amendment
and “that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ or a ‘motivating
factor’ in the Board's decision not to rehire him.” 172 The burden
then shifts to the defendant to show “that it would have reached the
same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the
absence of the protected conduct.”173

particular result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be
permissible that the causal relation exists.” Id. at 270.
169
See supra pages 1-2 (discussing facts of the Harris case).
170
Cases such as this are sometimes referred to as overdetermined
causation cases. See, e.g,. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law,
CAL L. REV. 1735, 1775 (“defining overdetermined causation cases as
“those cases in which a factor other than the specified act would have
been sufficient to produce the injury in the absence of the specified act,
but its effects were either (1) preempted by the more immediately
operative effects of the specified act or (2) combined with or duplicated
those of the specified act to jointly produce the injury.”).
171
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY __ (__ed. year).
172
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
173
Id.
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As I discuss in section IV of this Article, to obtain substantial
monetary damages, the court must find, inter alia, that the plaintiff
was deprived of a constitutional right and that the constitutional
deprivation caused the plaintiff to suffer an actual injury (i.e., there
is a causal link between the plaintiff’s deprivation and the
plaintiff’s injury). In Mt. Healthy, the court fails to make it clear
whether the substantial factor burden-shifting rule goes to remedy
or liability.174 Professor Nahmod argues Lesage clearly indicates
that the substantial factor burden shifting rules addresses the
question of liability.175 In other words the purpose of applying the
substantial factor test in Mt. Healthy was not to determine whether
the constitutional deprivation was the factual cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Rather, Lesage indicates that it was used to
determine whether there was even a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, it is far from clear that courts may rely on this test as
a means by which to establish factual causation when the
traditional but for test fails.
Furthermore, the substantial factor test may be inapplicable in this
context if courts adopt a narrow interpretation of the test. Under
some interpretations, this test is only applicable when there are
multiple acts but each act, alone, could have resulted in the
injury.176 This interpretation, however, does not account for
situations where no single cause would have resulted in the
plaintiff’s injury but the causes, when combined, form the “perfect
storm” necessary to bring about the plaintiff’s injury. 177 For
example, on its own, the victim’s testimony misidentifying Harris
as her attacker may have been insufficient for a jury to find Harris
guilty. However, when this testimony is combined with forensic
evidence that exaggerates the likelihood that the criminal
defendant is guilty and police testimony that overstates the
certainty with which the victim identified the criminal defendant,
174

See Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still
Doesn’t Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603, 607 (1999-2000) (“Before Lesage the
argument that Mt. Healthy's burden-shift should go to remedy and not to liability
derived considerable support from Carey, which the Court decided one year
after Mt. Healthy.”)
175
Id. at 609 (“in November 1999 the Court in Lesage . . . declared that Mt.
Healthy’s burden-shift rule goes to liability in all § 1983 damages actions based
on First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause violations.).
176
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS § 27
(2005) (“If multiple acts exist, each of which alone would have been a factual
cause of the physical harm . . . each act is regarded as a factual cause of the
harm.”)
177
Because wrongful convictions are often the result of many factors, this
situation often arises in this context. See CASTELLE & LOFUS, supra note 1, at 910 (describing various factors that may bring about wrongful convictions).
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the jury has sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty. “In
this situation, no candidate is a but-for cause, and none is a
sufficient cause.”178
2. Legal Causation
a. Legal Causation in the Common Law of
Torts
As previously noted, courts have imported both elements of
causation – factual causation and legal causation – into § 1983
litigation.179 Accordingly, even if a court concludes that the
defendant is a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury the defendant
will not be liable if the court determines that he was not the legal
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Nevertheless, there are marked
differences between legal causation in the common law of torts and
legal causation in § 1983 damages analysis.
Because there is no clear definition of legal causation, 180 it perhaps
is best described by what it does rather than what it is. Legal
causation is a policy decision to limit liability even where the
defendant is determined to be the factual cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.181 Of course, this raises the question as to the basis of that
limitation.
Legal scholars have advocated a number of different tests to
determine whether a defendant is the “legal cause” of the
plaintiff’s injury.182 Although the “substantial factor” test is often
178

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS § 27
(2005)
179
See, supra page 32.
180
Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV.
471, 471 (1950) (“Having no integrated meaning of its own, the chameleon
quality of proximate cause permits it be substituted for any of the elements of a
negligence case when decision on that element becomes difficult”); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 300 (5th ed. 1984)
(describing proximate cause as “something that is difficult, if not impossible, to
put into words”).
181
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at ___ (5th
ed. 1984) (defining proximate cause as “merely the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the actor’s
conduct”).
182
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1671, 1682-83 (2007). Owen makes the following observations regarding
attempts to determine proximate or legal causation:
[L]lawyers, courts, and juries invariably seek guidance in
unraveling the mysteries of [proximate causation], which has
led to an eternal search for a proper “test” for deciding
whether a plaintiff's injury in any particular case was a
proximate result of the defendant's wrong. Over the years,
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understood as a test for factual causation, The Second Restatement
also uses the substantial factor test to determine whether a
particular act is the legal or proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.183 The Second Restatement explains the test in this context
as follows:
In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is
not enough that the harm would not have occurred
had the actor not been negligent. . . . The
negligence must also be a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiff's harm. The word
“substantial” is used to denote the fact that the
defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing
the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a
cause, using that word in the popular sense, in
which there always lurks the idea of responsibility .
..
184

Other tests for legal causation include the test of foreseeability,
which resolves questions of proximate cause “by asking whether
any ordinarily prudent man would have foreseen that damage
would probably result from his act”185 and the “average sense of
justice” test, which balances “competing individual and social
interests.”186
b. Legal Causation in § 1983 Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that “§ 1983
‘should be read against the background of tort liability that makes
a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions’” 187
Nevertheless, many federal courts have adopted a far more
courts have applied a number of tests that still sometimes
inform judicial decisions, at least to some extent. A prominent
early test turned on whether a harmful result was a “direct
consequence” of the defendant's negligence. Under this test, a
cause is proximate which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the
plaintiff's harm. Today, the concept of “foreseeability,” in one
formulation or another, is the cornerstone of proximate cause.
Id.
183

RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TORTS) § 431 (year)
Id.
185
8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 450 (2d. ed 1937).
186
Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 343 (1924).
187
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1986) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 187 (1961)) (noting that § 1983 causation “should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions.”).
184
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stringent approach to legal causation in § 1983 litigation than that
applied in most common law tort cases. The remainder of this
section discusses how courts have approached the question of
proximate cause in § 1983 wrongful conviction cases. The first
approach discussed mirrors one approach applied in common law
tort cases – the defendant is deemed to be the proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s injuries if his constitutional breach is a “substantial
factor” in bringing about the injury (herein referred to as the “tortbased” approach). The second approach requires that plaintiff’s
harm be related to the risk the constitutional amendment was
intended to protect. In other words, under this second approach,
the question is not whether the defendant should have foreseen that
his conduct would result in the plaintiff’s injury; rather, the
question is whether the constitutional provision which the
defendant violated was intended to protect the plaintiff from the
injury suffered. Given its relation to the alleged constitutional
violation, I refer to this approach as the “constitutional approach”
to legal causation. The section goes on to demonstrate that the
approach a court adopts to determine whether the defendant’s
constitutional violation is the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury
can determine the outcome of a wrongful conviction claim. This
section concludes with a discussion of the policy justifications for
each approach.
Earl Washington Jr. is one of handful of § 1983 plaintiffs to
receive significant monetary damages for injuries suffered as a
result of his post-conviction incarceration where a large portion of
the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct occurred pre-trial.188 In
Washington, the Fourth Circuit makes the following observations
regarding the defendant’s pretrial conduct (before trial, Office
Wilmore drafted a police report falsely claiming that Washington
had voluntarily provided officers with non-public knowledge of the
crime):

188

Alan Cooper, Federal jury in Charlottesville awards man $2.25M for
fabricated confession, VIRGINIA LAWYERS WEEKLY, May 15, 2006 at ___. In
May of 1983 Earl Washington Jr. confessed to the rape and murder of woman in
Culpeper Virginia that had occurred one year prior. See Washington, 322
F.Supp. 2d at 706. He was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death. Id. at 707. Approximately ten years later, DNA evidence proved that
Washington could not have committed the crime of which he was convicted. Id.
According to recent accounts, Washington, who is mildly mentally retarded,
only confessed to the crime after a series of leading questions in which
interrogating officers disclosed information to Washington that was not
available to the public. Id at 709. The police report detailing Washington’s
confession, however, indicated that Washington voluntarily divulged non-public
information about the murder. Id at 709-710.
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Although it does not appear that the police report
influenced the decision to bring charges, it is
unquestionable
that
Washington's
apparent
nonpublic knowledge influenced the way in which
[the district attorney] prosecuted the case. [His]
arguments to the jury placed great emphasis on
Washington's knowledge of the details of the crime
scene. . . There is also sufficient evidence for a jury
to find that the fabrication of evidence influenced
not just the conduct of the prosecution, but the
jury's decision. The main evidence presented at
Washington's trial linking him to the crime was his
confession and the shirt found at the scene.
Bennett's emphatic arguments to the jury and the
misleading nature of the confession itself make
Washington appear more culpable than he would
otherwise have, had it been clear to the jury that he
had no prior knowledge of the crime.189
Again, it is important to note that this “fabricated” evidence was
obtained before Washington’s trial. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that Wilmore’s constitutional violation was the legal
cause of Washington’s conviction because it was a substantial
factor in the jury’s decision to convict him and in his subsequent
incarceration.190
In contrast, the court in Castellano adopted a more limited view of
legal causation.191
Like Earl Washington’s conviction,
Castellano’s conviction was due, in large part, to evidence that was
fabricated pre-trial and introduced at trial.192 The Fifth Circuit’s
analysis of legal causation, however, did not focus on the
defendant pretrial conduct but rather on the nature of the
constitutional violation.193 In other words, the court framed the
approach to legal causation around the question of “whether the
Fourth Amendment is intended to protect against the types of
harms for which the plaintiff seeks damages.” And, in short, the
189

Washington v. Buraker, No. CIVA302CV00106, 2006 WL 759675, at *8
(W.D. Va. 2006).
190
Presumably, the report detailing Earl Washington’s confession was drafted
before the charges against him were even filed. See id. Similarly, much of the
defendant’s bad conduct occurred pre-trial. Id. Nevertheless, the trial court
focused on the effect that this evidence had at trial. Id.
191
See Castellano, 352 F.3d at 959.
192
See, Ex parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d at 479 (concluding that the defendants
“collaborated together and without their testimony and the altered tapes, there is
insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt.”).
193
See, generally, Castellano, 352 F.3d 939.
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Court’s answer was “no.” In the court’s view “the umbrella of the
Fourth Amendment, broad and powerful as it is, casts its protection
solely over the pretrial events of a prosecution. . . the Fourth
Amendment will not support his damages arising from events at
trial and his wrongful conviction.”194
If one applies the “constitutional approach” to legal causation in
the Washington case and the foreseeability approach to the issue of
legal causation in Castellano it is difficult to deny the limiting
effect that the “constitutional approach” has on the availability of
damages in § 1983 cases. Under the constitutional approach to
legal causation, the effect the fabricated evidence had at the trial
stage of the criminal prosecution is beyond the scope of the legal
causation inquiry because it does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.195 In effect, under this view, the start of the criminal
trial bars liability for subsequent damages incurred even when
those damages were a foreseeable result of the defendant’s pre-trial
conduct.196 Stated slightly differently, a constitutional approach to
194

Castellano, 352 F.3d at 959. Cf, Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir.
2000). In Hector, the Third Circuit applied an even more limited constitutional
approach to legal causation. Id. There, the plaintiff was illegally detained in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure while
officers obtained a warrant to search his airplane. Id. at 155. After obtaining a
warrant, officers searched the plane and found over 80 pounds of hallucinogenic
mushrooms. Id. Plaintiff was charged and indicted, however, the criminal trial
court suppressed the drugs because officers violated the Fourth Amendment
when they detained Hector. Id. at 162 (J. Nygaard, concurring). Eventually, the
prosecution dismissed the charges. Id. Hector then filed a § 1983 suit against
the four officers who detained him seeking compensation for the costs he
incurred in his defense of the criminal case. Id. Noting that, “The evil of an
unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers
crime, which is no evil at all” Id. at 157 (quoting Townes v. City of New York,
176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.1999)). From this, the court concluded that “damages
for an unlawful search should not extend to post-indictment legal process, for
the damages incurred in that process are too unrelated to the Fourth
Amendment's privacy concerns.” Hector, 235 F.3d at 157.
195
The Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment only applies to conduct
occurring during search and seizure. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (The Fourth Amendment covers only ‘searches and
seizures’”). Furthermore, while it remains unclear precisely when seizure ends,
courts uniformly agree that the Fourth Amendment definition of “seizure” has
ended once the trial begins. See, e.g., Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174
3d. Cir. 1988 (“We conclude that the limits of Fourth Amendment protection
relate to the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention.”); Taylor v. Waters,
81 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that Fourth Amendment
requirements are satisfied once a probable cause determination has been made);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (applying 14th Amendment Due
Process clause to determine constitutionality of pretrial detainees’ punishment.).
196
The Fifth Circuit notes that there may be a case where a plaintiff’s recovers
“damages arising from the trial and wrongful conviction, as opposed to his arrest
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legal causation does not allow a § 1983 plaintiff who has been
deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights to recover damages for
harms suffered once the seizure has ended. In short, had the
Fourth Circuit approached legal causation from a constitutional
angle Washington would not entitled to damages stemming from
the years he spent incarcerated during and after his trial.
On the other hand, a “tort-based” (i.e., substantial factor) approach
to legal causation the damages would not seem to impose a bar on
the damages Castellano sought. Again, under this approach, the
applicable question is where the defendant’s constitutional breach
was a substantial factor in his subsequent conviction. Where, as
here, there are two key pieces of evidence presented at trial –
evidence the defendant fabricated pre-trial and the defendant’s
perjured testimony --- it seems fair to conclude that the defedant’s
pre-trial act of fabricating evidence was a substantial factor leading
to the plaintiff’s conviction. As such, the defendant would be
liable for damages Castellano suffered post-seizure under this tort
based approach
Clearly, the constitutional approach to legal causation and the tortbased approach to legal causation can have markedly different
effects on the damages available in § 1983 cases, which, in turn
begs the following question: why have courts adopted such varied
approaches to legal causation determinations in § 1983 wrongful
conviction cases.
Questions of liability and compensation in § 1983 cases often turn
on policy arguments. From a policy perspective § 1983, like all
civil actions for monetary damages forces judges to consider which
party should bear the costs of the plaintiff’s injuries – the plaintiff
or the defendant.
The constitutional approach limits liability to the risk the
constitutional provision was intended to protect against.197
Professor Jeffries explains the merits of limiting damages liability
to the constitutional risk involved as follows:
Sometimes, conduct violative of a constitutional
right will cause injury unrelated to the kinds of risks
that constitutional prohibitions were designed to
and pretrial detention, given the dismissal of all but Fourth Amendment claims.”
Castellano, 352 F.3d at 959.
197

See generally, John C. Jeffries, Damages for Constitutional Injuries: The
Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional, 75 VALR 1461 (1989)
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avoid. In such cases, there is a disjunction between
the reason the act is wrongful and the specific injury
that results from its commission. When this occurs,
“but for” causation lacks moral significance.
Whatever considerations of deterrence may suggest,
the noninstrumental case for compensation for
constitutional torts reaches only those injuries
caused by the wrongful- i.e., unconstitutional-aspect
of the government's behavior. Injury outside the
constitutionally relevant risks is morally
indistinguishable from the very broad range of
injury caused by lawful government action. Unless
a contrary answer is indicated by consideration of
incentive effects, such injury is appropriately
noncompensable.198
In comparison, the tort-based substantial factor approach tends to
emphasize the importance of compensating the “innocent
victim.”199 Perhaps this is most evident in Malley v. Briggs.200 In
Malley the respondents filed a § 1983 claim against State Tropper
Malley alleging that he violated their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by applying for an arrest warrant in the absence
of probable cause.201 At trial, the judge directed a verdict for the
defendant because that the magistrate judge’s act of issuing the
arrest warrants “broke the causal chain between petitioner's filing
of a complaint and respondents’ arrest.” 202 Although the defendant
did not pursue the “no causation” argument on his appeal, the
Court took care to note that “the District Court's ‘no causation’
rationale in this case is inconsistent with our interpretation of §
1983. . . § 1983 “should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions.”203 The Court recognized that where a § 1983
plaintiff “has done no wrong and has been arrested for no reason,
or bad reason” he is “most deserving” of § 1983 relief. 204 This
argument seems to reflect the belief that causation should not be
used as a tool to deflect costs from a negligent or malicious
defendant onto an “innocent” plaintiff.
198

Id. at 1470
Malley, 475 U.S. at 343 (noting that person “most deserving of a remedy” in
a § 1983 action is the “the person who in fact has done no wrong, and has been
arrested for no reason, or a bad reason.”)
200
Id.
201
Id. at 338.
202
Id. at 339.
203
Id. at 345 (quoting Monroe 365 U.S. at 187).
204
Id. at 343.
199
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As Castellano evidences, in the context of § 1983 wrongful
conviction claims, at least some courts have ignored the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Malley that questions of causation in § 1983
litigation should be “read against the background of tort
liability”205 and have instead approached questions of legal
causation in a far more restrictive way.206 Setting aside the basic
doctrinal problems with such an approach, there remain normative
problems with the “constitutional approach” to questions of legal
causation in § 1983 wrongful conviction actions. Viewed within a
normative framework, this question of how courts should approach
questions of causation in these actions becomes a question of
policy – on what basis should courts’ limit defendants’ monetary
liability in § 1983 actions? The constitutional approach limits a §
1983 defendant’s liability to the specific harms that the alleged
constitutional violation was intended to protect against.
In
contrast, the “tort based” approach limits liability to injuries that
were a substantial factor.

205
206

Malley, 475 U.S. at 343
See generally Castellano, 352 F.3d 939.
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V.

THE BIGGER PICTURE: THE
RELATIONSHIP AMONG
CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS,
CAUSATION AND LIABILITY IN § 1983
ACTIONS

While simplicity is often appealing (particularly in the context of
difficult legal questions) it is a mistake to approach the normative
issues raised causation in § 1983 wrongful conviction claims as if
they only arise in the context of legal causation. At first blush, the
policy rationales for requiring proximate cause in negligence
actions may seem equally applicable in § 1983 litigation.
Nevertheless, as this section of the article argues, § 1983
jurisprudence has developed in such a way that the role of
proximate cause in negligence actions – to limit liability to those
situations where it justifiable – has already been satisfied by other
elements, rendering the role of proximate cause in § 1983
redundant and largely unnecessary. Part A provides a brief
overview of the history of legal causation in the common law of
torts, focusing primarily on the policy reasons for limiting liability
in tort negligence actions. Part B then discusses the role of
qualified immunity in § 1983 litigation and compares the policy
concerns underlying the availability of qualified immunity and
those legal theorists and courts use to rationalize proximate cause
in negligence cases. This section concludes proximate cause is not
only an unnecessary limit on liability § 1983 cases, but it is
actually unjustified in those cases where the defendant has been
denied a qualified immunity defense.
A.

The History of Legal Causation

It has been more than a century since legal scholars began to
approach causation as two separate inquiries – factual causation
and legal, or proximate, cause.207 The development of legal
causation was driven by the “the practical need to draw the line
somewhere so that liability will not crush those on whom it is
put.”208
207

See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W. 2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1995) (J.
Cornyn, Concur) (“By the 1930s the [Legal] Realists’ influence was felt in
American law by the innovation of a new distinction between actual or but for
causation, on the one hand, and legal or proximate causation on the other,”
citing Morton J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, 63
(1992) (internal quotations omitted).
208
James Fleming Jr. and Roger F. Perry; Legal Cause, 60 YALE L. J. 761, 784
(1951); see also, e.g., Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64271, *18-*19 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2007) (Explaining “[l]egal or
proximate causation involves a determination that the nexus between the
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To truly assess the role legal causation should play in § 1983
litigation it is imperative that we view legal causation in a more
general context. Legal causation is only one half of the causation
inquiry. As discussed in greater detail in Part III, causation
consists of two parts --- factual causation and legal causation.
Again, factual causation is often a “simple” inquiry – requiring
only that “but for” for the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff would
not have suffered his injury.209 Strictly applied, “but for” causation
has the potential to result in endless liability. 210 The purpose of
legal causation is to limit liability to the cases in which the
defendant “should” be liable.211 As such, a conclusion that the
defendant is the “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s injury requires
some conclusion that the defendant is to “blame” for the plaintiff’s
injury.212 In short, legal causation is intended to limit defendant’s
liability to those situations in which the defendant has acted
“wrongfully.” 213
wrongful acts or omissions and the injury sustained is of such a nature that it is
socially and economically desirable to hold the wrongdoer liable.”).
209
See Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn. 1993) (“Causation, or
cause in fact, means that the injury or harm would not have occurred ‘but for’
the defendant's negligent conduct.”). See also Nielson v. Eisenhower &
Carlson, 999 P.2d 42, 46 (Wn. App. 2000) (“In a tort action, proximate cause
consists of two elements: cause in fact and legal causation. Cause in fact refers
to the "but for" consequences of an act, that is, the immediate connection
between an act and an injury. The ‘but for’ test requires a plaintiff to establish
that the act complained of probably caused the subsequent disability.”)
210
“It has been said that something as small as the flutter of a butterfly's wing
can ultimately cause a typhoon halfway around the world.” Similarly, it would
seem that under a theory of “but-for” cauastion one negligent act can result in a
harm several years in the future.
211
See Leon Green, Judge and Jury 196 (1930) (“[t]he problems dealt with
under ‘proximate causation’ involve limitations upon legal responsibility or
legal protection-- the phase of legal theory concerned with rights and duties.”).
212
See Joseph Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning ‘Legal Causation’ at
Common Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 35 (1909) (arguing the question is really
whether defendant’s conduct was a “legally blamable” cause of plaintiff’s
damage). Bingham stressed the “task is to determine whether defendant’s
wrongful act or omission was… a cause under such circumstances as to render
him legally responsible to plaintiff for the specific… consequences.” Id.
213
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, p. 264 (5th ed.
1984). ("As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance
that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set…");
see also Nielson v. Eisenhower & Carlson, 999 P.2d 42, 46 (Wn. App. 2000)
(“Legal causation rests on policy considerations determining how far the
consequences of a defendant's act should extend. It involves the question of
whether liability should attach as a matter of law, even if the proof establishes
cause in fact.”).
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Obviously, whether a particular act should be considered
“wrongful” is subject to debate. It is precisely this reason that
“legal causation” remains undefined despite a hundred year
discussion of its meaning. Whether a particular act is wrongful
will necessarily depend upon the policy considerations that one
wishes to advance.214 Tort cases discussing the policy reasons for
legal causation often cite “justice and fairness.” 215 Clearly,
however, one’s view of justice and fairness will depend upon
whether he is the plaintiff or defendant in a particular case. For
example, if one’s primary policy concern is compensation for harm
suffered, a lenient test of legal causation is the best way to further
this goal. Under this approach, so long as the plaintiff is able to
link the defendant’s conduct to the harm suffered, he should be
able to recover for that harm. If however, one’s primary policy
goal is deterrence, legal causation should be based upon the
foreseeability of the harm because, arguably, if a reasonable person
could not predict that his conduct would result in harm to another,
liability will not deter similar future conduct. In contrast, if one
adopts an economic view of blameworthiness, generally, a
defendant’s conduct will only be deemed wrong if the monetary
costs of his act outweigh its monetary benefits.216
Regardless of the arguments in favor of one approach as opposed
to another, in the end, given its policy-based foundation, legal
causation is likely to remain a worthy discussion point. So, rather
than debate the merits of one approach and shortcomings of
214

See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, p. 273 (5th ed. 1984)
(“whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to
the consequences which have in fact occurred.”).
215
See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Michael, 104 Md.App. 730, 821 (1995) (noting that
considerations of justice and fairness may militate against liability.”); Sumpter
v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 435 (Iowa App.,1994) (“The policy [of
proximate cause] is based on fairness and justice and seeks to restrict legal
responsibility of a tort-feasor to those causes that are so closely connected with
the result that our legal system is justified in imposing liability”); Seidel v.
Greenberg, 260 A.2d 863, 874 (N.J. Super. L. 1969) (“once the matter of
causation in fact has been established, the matter is largely one of policy justice
and fairness”).
216
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(applying economic formula (PL<B) to determine liability) Interestingly, when
it comes to questions of legal causation, American courts uniformly adopt the
defendant’s viewpoint – i.e., whether it would be just and fair to dub the
defendant the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Consequently, “[t]he test of
proximate cause which has been stated and applied more often than any other is
that which determines an injury to be the proximate result of negligence only
where the injury is the natural or reasonable and probable consequence of the
wrongful act or omission.” 57A AMERICAN. JURISPRUDENCE. 2D NEGLIGENCE §
485 (2008).
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another, I feel it more appropriate to consider why both academics
and scholars deemed it necessary to dissect causation into two
separate inquiries – one factual and the other policy based.
The rise of legal cause as a limitation on liability directly coincides
with the rise of negligence as a theory of tort law. In the grand
scheme of bases for liability, negligence is relatively “young” 217
The theory of negligence liability emerged from two older forms of
action – trepass and trespass on the case. Under a theory of
trespass, “any litigant who could show that he had sustained a
physical contact on his person or property, due to the activity of
another” was able to recover for the harms suffered as a result of
that contact.218 Trepass on the case, which grew out of the theory
of trepass, expanded liability by allowing litigants to recover for
injuries to self or property that were not the to result of “direct or
immediate force or violence.” 219 Gregory explains the relationship
among trespass, trespass on the case, and negligence as follows:
[B]ecause [those who sued in case] could not show
a trespassory contact, [they] had to submit some
item of illegality or fault to take the place of the
missing element of trespass in order to establish
liability. In actions on the case for inadvertently
caused harm to person or property, this new item of
illegality or fault ultimately became what we now
speak of as negligence
220

Unlike trespass, which required some proof of direct contact,
trespass on the case allowed a plaintiff to recover when he was
able to prove that by some fault of the defendant he suffered an
injury.221 As such, trespass on the case extended the basis for

217

Patrick Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and
the Present Darkness, 69 Wash U. L. Q. 49, 61 (1991) (“[n]egligence as a legal
conceptual category was a late-blooming plant, the result of an historical process
that culminated in the modern law of negligence in the early nineteenth century
and was not really finished until around 1840.”).
218
See Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REV. 359, 361-62
219
See Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil
Procedure 7 (2d ed. 1899) (explaining the writ of “trespass on the case” was
analogous to the writ of trespass but allowed litigants to recover when the
sustained physical contact was not the result of “direct or immediate force or
violence.”)
220
Gregory, supra note 19, at 363.
221
Id. Gregory offers the following useful example to distinguish between
liability under the writ of trespass and liability under the writ of trespass on the
case:
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liability so long as the plaintiff could prove fault. And as trespass
on the case gradually transformed into the substantive law of
negligence, proximate cause emerged as one of the devices by
which courts could limit a defendant’s liability. These limitations
were based upon policy considerations as to when a defendant
should be liable for injuries resulting from his careless or negligent
acts.222 Despite the many debates about what policy considerations
should govern proximate cause determinations, scholarship
discussing the history of the doctrine seems to agree, at least
tacitly, proximate cause only became an element of tort law as the
law of negligence took root. 223
B.

Qualified Immunity and Proximate Cause: A
Comparison
Much like proximate cause, qualified immunity is intended to limit
liability to those situations in which it is justified. The Supreme

Suppose the defendant in a particular instance was building a
house adjacent to the highway. As he was carrying a beam
along a scaffold, he stumbled and unintentionally hit a
passerby named White on the head, causing him severe harm.
While could easily procure a write of trespass and recover
damages. It was immaterial that the defendant dropped the
beam unintentionally; and it made no difference whether or
not the defendant was negligent or otherwise at fault. This
was a trepass under the early law; and this primitive
conception of trespass implied all the fault that was necessary
for liability.
Shortly thereafter, let us assume, Black came walking along
and stumbled over the beam, falling so that his head hit the
beam, with the result that he sustained identically the same
harm as that suffered by While. Suppose that the defendant
had not had time to remove the beam from the sidewalk nor to
post warnings; and also assume that Black neither saw the
beam as he walked along nor was careless in having failed to
see it. When Black sought a writ entitling him to sue the
defendant, there was none available which was appropriate for
his case; and he was unable to recover damages. That was
because there was no trespass by the defendant against him,
since the force initiated by the defendant had come to rest
before Black was hurt . . . . This apparent unbalance of justice
was no doubt responsible for the creation of new write, to be
issued in situations where harm had occurred otherwise than
by a direct or trespassory contact. This new writ was called
‘trepass in a similar case.’”
222
See Jerry J. Phillips, Thinking, 2 Tenn. L. Rev. 697, 741 (2005) (noting that
proximate cause is “bound up in doctrinal and policy considerations.”).
223
See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 218 at 56-57 (concluding “[m]odern proximate
cause doctrine in [sic] tort law seemed to spring up, without identifiable tort law
antecedents, in the middle of the nineteenth century.”).
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Court recognized the “good faith” or qualified immunity defense 224
for the first time in Pierson v. Ray.225 In Pierson, a group of
ministers participating in the “Freedom Rides” filed a § 1983 claim
against local judges and police officers alleging that their arrests
and convictions were in violation of the Constitution.226 The
ministers, however, were arrested four years before the Court held
that the statute under which the ministers’ were arrested was
“unconstitutional as applied to similar facts.” 227 Recognizing that
holding the defendant police officers liable in such a situation
would place them in an impossible situation of “being charged
with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does,” the Court
concluded that “the defense of good faith and probable cause . . . is
available to [officers] in [an] action under § 1983.” 228
Specifically, the Court held that “they should not be liable if they
acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest
under a statute that they believed to be valid.” 229 As the Court
continued to refine the good faith qualified immunity defense
throughout the 1970’s it made clear that an official would not be
liable for conduct that deprived another of a federally protected
right so long as she acted in “good faith.” 230
Although Wood’s good faith qualified immunity defense protected
officials from monetary liability, it did not protect most defendants
from the burdens of the civil litigation process. Most courts
viewed the question of “good faith” as a factual issue and because
questions of fact were to be determined by a jury most defendants
still had to go to trial to prove that they were entitled to qualified
224

The Court does not actually use the phrase “qualified immunity” until
Scheuer v. Rhodes in 1974. 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
225

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The ministers, however, were arrested
in 1961 – four years before the Court handed down its decision. Id. at 549.
Because it was not clear that the statute was unconstitutional at the time of the
plaintiffs’ arrest, the defendants argued “they should not be liable if they acted
in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that
they believed to be valid.” Id. at 555 (“they should not be liable if they acted in
good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they
believed to be valid”). Noting that “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he
must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does,” the
Court concluded that “the defense of good faith and probable cause . . . is
available to [officers] in [an] action under § 1983.” Id. at 557 (1967).
226
Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 215 (Miss. 1965).
227
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549, 550.
228
Id at 555.
229
Id.
230
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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immunity.
This, of course, required defendants to participate in
the pre-trial process, which includes, among other things, filing an
answer, answering interrogatories, and appearing for depositions.
To allow the more efficient resolution of “insubstantial” § 1983
claims, in Harlow the Court revamped the “good faith qualified
immunity” test by eliminating the “good faith” or subjective
prong.232 Specifically, the Court held that “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”233 The Court went onto
elaborate on the defense as follows:
If the law at that time was not clearly established,
an official could not reasonably be expected to
anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could
he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade
conduct not previously identified as unlawful. . . .
If the law was clearly established, the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably
competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official
pleading the defense claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew
nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard, the defense should be sustained. But
again, the defense would turn primarily on objective
factors.
234

The Court’s subsequent interpretations of Harlow and qualified
immunity indicate that qualified immunity protects officials from
conduct that is not at least reckless or malicious. For example, in
Malley v. Briggs, the Court noted, “as the qualified immunity
defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the

231

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-17 (1982).
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17 (“The subjective element of the good-faith
defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. . . . Bare allegations of malice
should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or
to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”(citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478 (1978)).
232

233
234

Id at 818.
Id at 818-19.
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plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.” 235
As Professor Armacost argues, “[an] important rationale for
qualified immunity . . . is that it would be unfair to hold
governmental officials to constitutional rules they could not
reasonably have known.”236 Armacost explains, “officials who
make reasonable legal judgments that are later adjudicated
unconstitutional may not be sufficiently blameworthy to warrant
the imposition of constitutional damages liability.”237 In short,
qualified immunity limits liability to those situations where the
defendant was somehow “blameworthy.” As such, qualified
immunity, like proximate cause acts as a limitation on liability.
Furthermore, once qualified immunity is introduced as a
determining factor in § 1983 litigation, liability under § 1983
becomes markedly different from liability under a negligence
regime. As the Court has explained, “qualified immunity seeks to
ensure that defendants ‘reasonably can anticipate when their
conduct may give rise to liability.’”238 In other words, qualified
immunity insures that only those officials who should know their
conduct is illegal are liable.
Culpability may be viewed as a spectrum, with negligent behavior
at the low end (least culpable) and purposeful conduct at the high
end (most culpable). § 2.02 of the Model Penal Code divides
levels of culpability into four categories: (1) purposefully239 (2)
knowingly240 (3) recklessly241 and (4) negligently.242 Under the
235

Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Although decided before Harlow, in Scherer, the
Court made a similar observation, noting “the injustice, particularly in the
absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the
legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
236
Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583, 588-89 (1998).
237

Id. at 590
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997).
239
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (“A person acts purposely with respect to a
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of
his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of
that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the
attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or
he believes or hopes that they exist.”).
238

240

Id. (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his
conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.”).
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common law of torts “no fault” may be considered a fifth category
of culpability.243 Thus, when a court determines that a defendant
has deprived another of his constitutional rights and is not entitled
to qualified immunity it may fairly be assumed that the defendant
has acted with a higher degree of culpability than that required
under the common law of negligence.
On its face, the § 1983 statute does not require any specific state
of mind.244 Nevertheless, qualified immunity, which shields
government officials from monetary liability even in those cases
where there has been statutory deprivation, does introduce a state
of mind requirement – qualified immunity insures that only those
persons who recklessly or intentionally disregard plaintiffs’ rights
are liable for monetary damages.245 This, in turn, means that
government officials are not liable under § 1983 for merely
negligent conduct. As such, the level of culpability required for §
1983 monetary liability is higher than that required for a torts
negligence claim.
Given the fundamental difference between the level of culpability
required for § 1983 liability and that required for negligence
241

Id. (“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actor's situation.”).
242

Id. (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor’s situation.”).
243
Products liability is based on the idea of no fault or strict liability (the
plaintiff , of course, is required to prove that the product was defective.) See, e.g,
Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 (1963) (“A manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being.”).
244
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see John C. Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional
Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 98 (1989)
(“Technically, section 1983 does not require culpability. That is to say, the cause
of action for money damages under section 1983 does not require proof of any
state of mind apart from that which may be required bythe definition of the
underlying right.”).
245
See id. (noting that qualified immunity will preclude damages when “a
government officer reasonably believes in the lawfulness of action that the
courts subsequently disapprove.”).
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liability, the Court’s decision to limit § 1983 liability based upon
those policy arguments that support limiting liability in negligence
cases seems ill-conceived. Defendants who have been denied
qualified immunity in § 1983 cases are not simply negligently
actors --- they have acted, at a minimum recklessly, and in many
cases their acts are intentional. This is particularly true of those
defendants in wrongful conviction cases. In each of the three cases
detailed in this article, Harris, Washington, and Castellano, the
defendants intentionally manipulated evidence so that the suspects
would appear guilty in their criminal trials. There is little question
that it is unconstitutional to fabricate evidence, as each of these
defendants did. Furthermore, where, as here, the defendant has
violated a clearly established constitutional rule, he will not be
entitled to a qualified immunity defense. Despite all of this, some
courts have used causation to limit defendants’ liability in these
circumstances.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As alluded to in the previous pages, the “wrong” of a wrongful
conviction does not end upon sentencing and incarceration but
continues into the civil process for determining § 1983 monetary
awards. Courts approach to causation in § 1983 is deeply flawed.
In those cases the defendant has clearly acted wrongly at the
expense of an “innocent” person. And, innocence, in this context
has dual meanings. Not only are these exonorees innocent of the
criminal trespass of which they’ve been convicted --- they are
innocent of any civil wrong. Nevertheless, courts have used
causation as a basis to deny exonorees monetary compensation for
their wrongful convictions.
Often, questions of liability, regardless of the context, involve
complicated questions of caustion, fault, and policy. This is no
less true in § 1983 wrongful conviction cases. However, the way
in which courts have approached questions of causation in § 1983
wrongful conviction cases suggests they have not adequately
considered the way in fault and policy might influence causation
determinations.
As discussed in Part IV, the Court has instructed courts that
questions of causation in § 1983 litigation “should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions.” 246 Applying the common
law of torts’ negligence approach to causation determinations to
246

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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causation determinations in § 1983 wrongful conviction claims
can, in many cases result in a finding of no liability. Wrongful
convictions almost never happen for one reason but instead are
usually the result of several different acts. As such, they are not
easily amenable to the but-for test for factual causation. The
Court, however, has failed to offer any other test for factual
causation in § 1983 claims. Additionally, lower courts have used
legal causation to deny exonorees a monetary remedy against
constitutional tortfeasors whose actions caused (or at least
increased the likelihood of) their convictions. As Part IV details,
courts typically apply one of tests to determine whether a
defendant is the “legal cause” of an exonoree’s conviction and
ensuing damages. Under the “torts based” approach “the
defendant is deemed to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries if his constitutional breach is a “substantial factor” in
bringing about the injury.” In contrast, the “constitutional
approach” “requires that plaintiff’s harm be related to the risk the
constitutional amendment was intended to protect.”
This causal relationship required under the “constitutional
appraoch” is more rigoros than that required under the “tort based
approach.” This is problematic in two respects. First, from a
doctrinal perspective, it ignores the Supreme Court’s admonition
that causation in § 1983 actions should “be read against the
backdrop of tort liability.” Second, and even more problematic,
there are few normative justifications for limiting the liability of
these constitutional tortfeasors. Proximate cause emerged as a way
to limit liability in cases in which the defendant merely acted
negligently but, nonetheless, “but-for” causation exposes him to
tremendous liability. However, in cases where the defendant has
violated the constitution, which, in many cases, he has sworn to
uphold, and a reasonable person in his position would know that
his conduct was unlawful the defendant has not simply engaged in
a “negligent” act. Instead, he has acted with a much higher degree
of culpability.
Unfortunately, judicial determinations regarding casuation in §
1983 wrongful conviction cases have failed to consider how other
determinations --- such as a conclusion that the defedant has
violated the constitution and is not entitled to qualified immunity –
might effect the policy considerations that underlie cauation
determinations. Legal causation is a policy question yet, given the
effect of a “no-qualified immunity” determination, neither the tortbased model nor the constitutional model are justifiable approach
to questions of causation in wrongful conviction claims.
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This is not to suggest that causation has no role in § 1983 litigation
--- causation is an important element in any legal action --- but
courts should reconsider the way in which questions of causation
are approached in § 1983 wrongful conviction cases, and § 1983
litigation in general. Because § 1983 is a conglomeration of so
many different legal areas, causation determinations need not
mirror those applied in common law negligence actions. The tests
for causation employed in other legal contexts, such as criminal
evidentiary suppression motions and intentional torts actions, from
a normative perspective, may be more appropriate tests for
causation in § 1983 claims. And, from a practical perspective, by
applying these tests in § 1983 litigation, the “wrong” of wrongful
convictions might corrected, at least to some degree, through
compensatory damages.
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